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 Darwin’s theory of natural selection has played a central role in the development of the 
biological sciences, but evolution can also explain change in human culture. Institutions, 
mechanisms that govern behavior and social order, are important subjects of cultural evolution. 
Institutions can help stabilize cooperation, defined as behavior that benefits others, often at a 
personal cost. Cooperation is important for solving social dilemmas, scenarios in which the 
interests of the individual conflict with those of the group. A number of mechanisms by which 
institutions evolve to support cooperation have been identified, yet theoretical models of 
institutional change have rarely been applied to local food institutions, which may be sustained 
by cooperation (Ikerd, 2012; Renting, Schermer, & Rossi, 2012; Tremblay & Waring, 2015). 
This thesis poses the general question, how do local food institutions and organizations evolve?  
 Chapter one uses a macro-evolutionary framework to explore the emergence and spread 
of two local food policies over time and space. First, I demonstrate how the rapid proliferation of 
cottage food laws in the U.S. is consistent with positive selection pressure at the individual, 
group, and state levels. Second, I illustrate how social learning and group transmission played a 
key role in the spread and diffusion of a municipal food sovereignty ordinance in Maine, 
ultimately changing selection pressure at the state level and amplifying town-level adoption. 
Finally, I offer concluding thoughts about the application of this framework to similar cases, 
including the propagation of single-use plastic bag bans.  
Chapter two serves as a micro-evolutionary analysis of organizational change in food 
buying clubs, small organizations which use collective purchasing power to obtain bulk 
quantities of organic, local, and specialty foods. Since these groups require cooperation from 
members through order-sharing and shared work tasks, I hypothesize that successful clubs 
possess traits which allow them to sustain cooperation and overcome social dilemmas. I predict 
that club members will be cooperative toward their groups, and that successful clubs will 
exercise generalized reciprocity and adopt rules to stabilize cooperation. Data from online 
surveys, experimental economic games, and phone interviews were analyzed using mixed 
methods to identify patterns of cooperation in groups. My results provide general support for my 
hypothesis that successful clubs have adaptations suited to overcome challenges. Specifically, I 
find that 1) buying club members are especially cooperative toward their groups when compared 
to other populations, 2) clubs exercise reciprocity in order-sharing, 3) reciprocity itself may not 
be a group adaptation, but group size is sufficient to support reciprocity in clubs, and 4) the 
adoption of rules is likely a key factor in club success and longevity. Finally, I offer practical 
advice for buying club management and operation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LOCAL FOOD POLICY & AUTONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In the period following the Second World War, rapid technological advancement led to 
an increase in the use of agricultural pesticides, fertilizers, and new strains of high yield crops 
around the world (Pingali, 2012). Known as “The Green Revolution,” this era brought 
tremendous growth in agricultural output and helped to forge a new global food economy. 
Pioneers of this revolution were praised for alleviating hunger. Most notably Norman Borlaug 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his efforts to fight food insecurity by developing 
highly modernized agricultural systems of much larger scale than traditional systems (Hesser & 
Carter, 2006). While such systems are extremely efficient, providing an abundance of high-
calorie foods at low costs to consumers, they have also given rise to many concerns including 
negative human health impacts, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, climate change, and 
new challenges for small-scale farming operations and local food systems (Pollan, 2006). Recent 
interest in small-scale, local, and sustainable food provision is largely motivated by increasing 
public concern about industrial, commodity-driven food systems, as in the U.S. and other nations 
around the world (Oosterveer, Sonnenfeld, & Sonnenfeld, 2012).  
The recent surge in consumer demand for locally-produced food in the U.S. is rooted in 
the movement toward a more resilient, sustainable, community-governed food system (Martinez, 
2010). Organizations including farmers’ markets, food hubs, buying clubs, food co-ops, and 
community-supported agriculture (CSA) expand consumer choices and allow for more 
democratic participation in the food system (Renting et al., 2012). These business models 
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provide alternatives to traditional markets, strengthening consumer freedom of choice and 
helping communities build a sense of autonomy over their food production. The U.S. local food 
movement is also closely related to the global movement toward food sovereignty, defined as 
“the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically 
sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems” 
(“What is Food Sovereignty,” 2013). The food sovereignty movement has been gaining 
momentum since the 1990s when it was pioneered by members of La Vía Campesina, an 
international organization of farmers dedicated to advocating for peasant rights, sustainable food 
production, and global food security. Activists have described food sovereignty as a movement 
away from the global, neoliberal, industrial food system toward a more just, sustainable, and 
localized system (Patel, 2009; Shiva, 2005). Since the 1990s, formal declarations of food 
sovereignty have been spreading and diffusing from rural to urban areas around the world 
(McMichael, 2014). The Food Sovereignty movement outlines broad policy goals for national 
governments and other political bodies, including equitable land ownership, property rights 
reform, farmer rights to save seed, fair prices for producers and consumers, subsidies for small-
scale producers and workers, increased funding for agricultural extension services, and citizen 
involvement in policy design and implementation (Pimbert, 2009). Seven countries have adopted 
formal food sovereignty legislation, including Ecuador, Venezuela, Mali, Bolivia, Nepal, 
Senegal, and Egypt (Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, 2010). While the United States has yet to 
adopt food sovereignty legislation at the federal level, there is evidence that related policies have 
been emerging and spreading at the municipal and state levels, which will be explored further in 
this chapter.  
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In the U.S., the food sovereignty movement has manifested in the widespread adoption of 
cottage food laws, which aim to support small-scale producers of low-risk, shelf-stable food 
items by exempting them from state regulations (Rice, Leib, & Balkus, 2018). Cottage food laws 
have been taken a step further in states such as Wyoming, which passed the “Food Freedom Act” 
in 2015 and recently amended it to exempt the in-state production and sale of meat products from 
regulation (Food Freedom Act-Amendments, 2017). North Dakota was the second state to adopt 
similar legislation in 2017, and Utah passed a more restrictive version in 2018 (Sibilla, 2019). 
The state of Maine has recently experienced the spread of a municipal food sovereignty 
ordinance, which exempts the local sale of raw and perishable items from state licensure and 
inspection. This municipal ordinance has spread rapidly across the state since 2011 (St. Peter, 
2011), and was reinforced by the state’s adoption of the Maine Food Sovereignty Act in 2017 
(Bayly, 2017). The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the process of policy evolution across 
multiple levels of governance by studying the emergence and spread of cottage food laws in the 
U.S. and food sovereignty ordinances in Maine.  
Economic Conditions & Policy Considerations 
Increasing efficiency in the agriculture sector has created challenging economic 
conditions for small and mid-size farms, which have been experiencing a long term decline in the 
U.S. since the period following the Green Revolution (Wadley, 1985). The share of total annual 
farm sales generated by small farming operations (generating less than $250,000 in sales) has 
rapidly declined, with small farms accounting for only 14 percent of sales in 2007, down from 41 
percent in 1982 (Hoppe, 2010). The Green Revolution, in tandem with commodity-focused 
government subsidies, has created a path-dependent food system in the U.S. where the increasing 
need to maximize efficiency through industrial practices has stymied the growth and success of 
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small-scale, diversified farms (Gowdy & Baveye, 2018; Iles & Marsh, 2012). Mid-size farms, 
known as “agriculture of the middle,” may face an even steeper challenge in this economic 
climate because they are not well suited for bulk commodity production or in-person sale of 
specialty items (Thompson & Gaskin, 2018).  
Policymakers have been challenged to offer solutions that help small-scale food 
industries thrive in these economic conditions.  At the federal level, the Farm Bill includes key 
provisions for local food, including planning and implementation grants (Starmer, 2017), 
expansion of EBT benefits to farmers’ markets, and support for research in areas like organic 
farming, farmland stewardship, crop innovation (“SNAP in the Farm Bill”). Local food policies 
have also been spreading at the state level. For example, Maine’s L.D. 1584 was signed into law 
in 2018, requiring all Maine government institutions (except local schools) to source 20 percent 
of food from local producers by 2025 (Strout, 2018). This act was inspired by many higher 
education institutions, which have recently pledged to source a certain percent of foods locally 
by a given date (Pols, 2018).  
A grassroots movement toward food sovereignty has also emerged at the municipal and 
state levels in the form of deregulation. The movement toward the deregulation of local food is a 
direct response to the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), which sought to reduce 
foodborne illness outbreaks by expanding the FDA’s authority on food production, harvest, and 
processing (Food Safety Modernization Act, 2011). Proponents of deregulation argue that the 
FSMA favors industrial systems and undermines small-scale farmers by imposing crippling costs 
with respect to licensing and inspection (Kurtz, 2015). The enactment of the FSMA, coupled 
with the 2008 recession which led to the rise of the gig economy (Friedman, 2014), created 
conditions ripe for the spread of cottage food and food sovereignty legislation in the early 2010s. 
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The pressure to generate additional income streams rose during the recession, which spurred 
growth in the cottage food industry (Burger, 2017). Contrary to other industries, the local food 
industry has continued to grow in the period following the 2008 recession. Between 2007 and 
2015, the number of farmers’ markets in the U.S. grew 180 percent, the number of food hubs 
increased threefold, and farm-to-school programs grew 430 percent (Low, 2015). This trend 
suggests that local food institutions can be resilient and even thrive during times of economic 
downturn.  
The neoclassical economic view offers insight into some of the driving forces behind the 
spread of cottage food and food sovereignty legislation. Rational choice theory holds that the 
collective behavior of a society is driven by individual, utility-maximizing choices (Blume & 
Easley, 2008). Neoclassical economists might argue that municipalities and states, seeking to 
maximize benefits, will adopt legislation at based upon local industry needs and comparative 
advantages. For instance, because cottage food laws reduce costs for small home bakers, states 
with larger home baking industries might be more likely to adopt such policies. In the case of the 
food sovereignty ordinance, which reduces costs for small farms, towns with more small farms 
may be more likely to adopt this type of policy than those with large farming operations or no 
farming industry at all. Economic theory helps explain the choice of whether or not to adopt 
certain legislation, given the associated benefits and costs. However, this approach does not 
necessarily help explain how policies might spread via social learning between individuals and 
groups.  
Policy Diffusion  
Recent literature examining the mechanisms of policy emergence and spread represents a 
departure from the more traditional, top-down legislation framework. The growing body of 
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literature on multilevel governance, particularly in the natural resource management context, 
emphasizes the importance of decision-making at every level from local organizations to global 
institutions (Lang, Barling, & Caraher, 2001; Nelson & Winter, 2002; Piattoni, 2009; 
Stephenson, 2013). Research has shown that “local-level governments can evolve into a resilient 
collaboration of multi-level governance when national institutions recognize the importance of 
smaller governance units and work with them rather than destroying them" (Ostrom & Janssen, 
2005). Other work has focused on analyzing the specific mechanisms of policy spread and 
diffusion across different levels of governance. Policy diffusion is the idea that states and 
localities may serve as “policy laboratories” which aid in the geographical and hierarchical 
spread of policies. Political scientists have been studying and debating the mechanisms of policy 
spread and diffusion for decades (Shipan & Volden, 2006, 2006; Tews, 2005; Tews, Busch, & 
Jörgens, 2003). Shipan and Volden observed three mechanisms of policy diffusion: learning 
from, competing with, and imitating other entities, as well as being coerced by state 
governments. Tews’ work has focused on environmental policy diffusion at the international 
level, as well as the diffusion of ideas in the field and policy convergence.  
Framework: Cultural Multilevel Selection Theory 
Building on the policy diffusion literature, I propose the use of an evolutionary 
framework to add explanatory and predictive value to the case of food autonomy laws in the 
United States. Anthropologists, psychologists and economists have used the generalized 
framework of adaptive evolution to identify patterns in individual and group behavior over time 
and develop causal mechanistic explanations and predictive tools. Natural selection, the process 
by which adaptive evolution occurs, requires three elements: variation, transmission, and 
selection. Variation is defined as differences among traits in individuals, transmission or heredity 
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is the passing on of traits from one generation to the next, and selection is the differential 
survival and/or reproduction of individuals due to trait variation (Darwin, 1859). Adaptive 
evolution is distinguished from genetic drift, or random fluctuations in a trait due to chance 
variation in random copying (Hahn & Bentley, 2003). While Darwin’s work was largely 
predicated on individual-level selection, he conjectured that natural selection may also operate 
on ethical principles (Darwin, 1859), hinting at the concept of cultural evolution via group-level 
selection (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). The theory of group selection describes the evolutionary 
process by which intergroup competition drives group-advantageous behavior, often leading 
more cooperative groups to outcompete less cooperative ones. This theory paved the way for the 
development of Multilevel Selection Theory (MLS), which suggests that the Darwinian 
principles of variation, transmission and selection operate at numerous levels from genes, to 
cells, to organisms, and groups of organisms (Wilson & Wilson, 2007).  
Cultural evolution uses Darwinian principles to explain how language and institutions 
function as social mechanisms of inheritance or units of replication (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 
2004). Similar to the way genes are passed down from one generation to the next, cultural traits 
including languages, music, art, tools, technologies, and religions are transmitted through 
cultural inheritance, peer influence, parent-offspring correlations, and descent in culture. 
Multilevel selection recognizes that in theory, selection can happen at any level. The level at 
which selection is strongest is known as the dominant level of selection (Okasha, 2006).    
Evolutionary Social Science as a Tool for Policy Analysis 
The value of evolutionary social science is that it ties together the most useful elements 
from economics, psychology, and anthropology into one framework driven by observable 
biological principles (Gintis, 2014). It is unrealistic to expect the social sciences to converge to 
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one general understanding, given their fragmented nature. In fact, disciplines are more likely to 
diverge from one another, underscoring the need for a unifying framework (Wilson & Gowdy, 
2013). Applying an evolutionary framework to the social sciences adds great richness to our 
collective understanding of who we are, how we became this way, and how we can make 
decisions today to better our prospects in the future.  
There are many tools from evolution that can be applied to political science. Leveraging 
intergroup competition, for instance, can be used in policy analysis and development. Henrich 
(2015) explains how different forms of intergroup competition, including differential group 
survival (successful groups survive in harsh environments), migration (successful groups grow 
through immigration), reproduction (successful groups grow through reproduction), and prestige-
based between-group learning (individuals learn from other individuals in successful groups), 
drive the spread and evolution of culture. Understanding how culture evolves can help 
policymakers identify conditions which may support or hinder the spread and diffusion of 
policies across time and space.  
The use of evolutionary principles to help explain the emergence and adoption of policies 
over time has been utilized in a handful of studies. Waring and Acheson (2018) implement a 
rubric for cultural group selection to analyze the history of lobster fishing laws and regulations 
on the coast of Maine, including the v-notch law, escape-vent law, and voluntary trap limits. The 
authors identified between-group imitation and learning as the dominant mechanisms of group 
selection in this context, suggesting the adoption of lobster fishing policy is largely a social 
phenomenon among harvesters, managers and other key stakeholders in the industry. The case of 
the Maine lobster industry provides an example of the value of multilevel selection for 
understanding policy evolution. Waring et al. (2015) develop a multilevel evolutionary 
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framework for analyzing sustainability behavior and policy. Here, I will use this framework to 
study two cases of local food policy diffusion. Following Waring et al. (2015), I will track 
evolutionary factors in each case by detailing the focal trait, policy environment, history, and 
levels of selection. 
Case Study Analyses 
Focal Trait: Cottage Food Laws in the U.S. 
Cottage food laws across the United States seek to support local food systems by 
exempting cottage food operations from food safety regulations and licensing. Cottage food 
operations are small, in-home kitchens run by individuals who sell and market their products 
locally. While cottage food laws vary from state to state, the term “cottage food” typically 
includes non-hazardous or shelf-stable items like baked goods, jams and other preserved foods, 
dry baking mixes, granola, popcorn, and candies. These laws generally do not provide 
protections for raw meat, dairy, eggs, or other perishable items. While the food sovereignty 
movement and related “food freedom” laws are generally more comprehensive by allowing the 
sale of raw and perishable items, cottage food laws provide opportunities for small-scale, 
artisanal, and local food businesses to thrive.   
Policy Environment. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants all states the right 
to regulate the intrastate production and sale of foods. While the federal government maintains 
control of interstate commerce, foods produced and consumed within state lines are regulated by 
the states themselves (Rice et al., 2018). The adoption of cottage food laws across U.S. states 
over the last thirty years has been driven in large part by growing demand for locally-produced 
foods. Locally-produced food sales rose from $5 billion in 2008 to $12 billion in 2014, a trend 
which is expected to continue by reaching $20 billion by 2019 (Vilsack, 2016).  
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History. The first cottage food law in the U.S. was passed in Vermont in 1951, with Maine and 
New York later adopting similar laws in 1980. Cottage food law data collected from 
LawAtlas.org (2017) and the Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic (2018) show that 
these laws continued to spread across jurisdictions throughout the 1990s, and gained momentum 
in the late 2000s and 2010s. From 2007-2012, an average of five states per year adopted some 
type of cottage food law (Burger, 2017). As of 2018, all U.S. states except for New Jersey have 
adopted some type of cottage food law which aims to protect small-scale food businesses (Rice 
et al., 2018). The spread of these laws appears to be partly determined by geographical 
proximity, spreading from the Northeast, to the Midwest, and finally to the perimeter states (see 
Figure 1.1).  
 The passage of these cottage food laws has led to the revival of the age-old cottage food 
industry. A survey of 775 cottage food producers in 22 states found that cottage food laws have 
been important for rural economic development by providing entrepreneurial opportunities, 
particularly for women with below-average income (McDonald, 2017). This study also found 
that industrial-scale food regulations can hinder the viability of cottage foods, but well-designed 
cottage food laws provide the flexibility and support needed to help these businesses thrive.   
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Figure 1.1. The Spread of Cottage Food Laws in The United States1  
Data provided by LawAtlas.org 
 
Levels of Selection. The adoption of cottage food laws is typically favored by cottage food 
producers and consumers who stand to gain an economic advantage from their passage. These 
laws may increase small scale food production and support the growth of this industry, 
particularly in rural areas. Thus, perhaps there is a positive selection for political support for 
cottage food laws among producers and consumers. Social learning has been an important 
mechanism for the spread of this policy at the individual level; the excitement around the 
movement has inspired entrepreneurs and patrons of local food to spread the word (Morris, 
2011). Spatial diffusion may also play a role in the spread of these laws, as states in closer 
																																																						
1 Not shown: Alaska and Hawaii adopted cottage food laws in 2012 and 2017, respectively 
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proximity appear to have adopted them around the same time period (see Figure 1). This 
provides evidence of social transmission between states. Producers have also engaged with these 
laws by bringing lawsuits to court in states with more restrictive laws or no cottage food 
provision at all. These challenges have been successful in establishing and improving existing 
cottage food laws in states like Minnesota and Wisconsin. At the next level, selection is 
supported by groups of businesses and associations, including the New Jersey Home Bakers 
Association, which have also brought legal challenges to the state laws regarding cottage food 
production (Rice et al., 2018).  
 At the level of the state legislature, the popularity and widespread success of cottage food 
laws suggest that selection favors adoption. The U.S. federal system, granting the power to 
govern intrastate commerce to the states, has played a key role in allowing the spread of such 
laws. The case of cottage food laws is an excellent example of states serving as laboratories of 
democracy, a key motivation of federalist and multilevel governance structures (New State Ice 
Co. v. Leibmann, 1932). The successful legal cases brought forth by businesses and associations 
in order to institute, alter and improve cottage food laws show that the courts also favor cottage 
food laws, and serve as an important mechanism for businesses owners to self-advocate and 
influence public policy. The courts also allow the process of policy adoption to be iterative, as 
laws continue to evolve by being re-shaped and improved by governing bodies to better suit the 
changing needs of small businesses and the local food economy more broadly (Rice et al., 2018). 
Summary. The widespread and rapid adoption of cottage food laws across the U.S. in recent 
years is an example of how policies can spread across jurisdictions given the right conditions. A 
number of social and economic factors including growing demand for local food, harsh 
economic conditions as a result of the Great Recession, and the constitutional right of states to 
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self-govern appear to have created positive selection pressure favoring policy adoption at 
multiple levels.  
Focal Trait: Maine’s Food Sovereignty Ordinance 
Maine’s municipal food sovereignty ordinance, titled the “Local Food and Community 
Self-Governance Ordinance” (LFCSGO) declares the right of a townspeople to “produce, 
process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods” by exempting small producers from state 
licensure, inspection, liability, and all other state food regulations pertaining to direct producer-
to-consumer transactions (Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance (Template), 
2017). While the LFCSGO (commonly referred to as the food sovereignty ordinance, or FSO) 
does not apply to meat or poultry production, which is regulated by the state’s inspection 
program, it exempts the production and direct sale of dairy, eggs, produce and other perishable 
items from state food regulations. The rapid spread of the FSO across Maine towns from 2011-
2018 represents an amplification of the cottage food movement, seeking to protect small-scale 
producers from burdensome regulations. The ordinance’s provisions make it more 
comprehensive and aggressive than cottage food laws, suggesting that cottage food laws alone 
might not go far enough in areas where local food systems and more traditional foodways are 
thriving.  
Policy Environment. Demand for locally-produced foods has been on the rise in the U.S. since 
the late 2000s (Day-Farnsworth et al., 2009). This growth in demand has been observed in 
Maine, with 80 percent of Maine consumers preferring food grown, raised or caught in Maine in 
2013 (Maine Food Strategy, 2014). Changing demands have led to an increase in the value of 
Maine’s crop and livestock operations by 24% from 2007-2012 and the number of farms by 
13.6% during this period (Valigra, 2014). Young people are also seeking farming careers in 
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Maine, with a 185 percent increase in the number of Maine farmers age 25-34 from 2002-2007 
(Harlow, 2013) contrasting with the national trend of rapidly aging farmers (USDA, 2017).  
Growth in Maine’s local food sector has led to increased interest in the legal 
ramifications of small-scale food production, particularly the sale of raw meats, dairy and eggs. 
The cost of compliance with state regulations presents a significant burden to small producers in 
the state, who have attempted but failed to institute scale-appropriate state regulations (Kurtz, 
2015). Failure to induce legal changes at the state level sparked the inception and spread of the 
LFCSGO throughout the state, beginning in 2011 and continuing into 2018.  
History. Maine’s food sovereignty ordinance was first penned and adopted in 2011 by five 
coastal Maine towns: Blue Hill, Penobscot, Sedgwick, Trenton, and Hope. A key driving factor 
in the spread of the FSO has been Local Food Rules (LFR), a group of activists led by farmer 
Heather Retberg of Quill’s End Farm in Penobscot. Since its formation in 2011, LFR has been 
working to help Maine towns pass the ordinance. Data collected from LocalFoodRules.org 
(2018) show that a total of 45 municipalities representing thirteen of Maine’s counties have 
adopted the ordinance (see Figure 1.2). The spread of the municipal ordinance across Maine 
appears to be at least partly influenced by geographical proximity, beginning in the Midcoast 
region and spreading through the interior of the state, suggesting that the adoption of the FSO 
may also be transmitted via social learning from friends and neighbors.  
Until recently, the ordinance itself did not provide any legal protection at the state level 
for farmers. The first test of the ordinance’s legal validity failed in 2013 when Blue Hill farmer 
Dan Brown was issued an injunction for the unlicensed sale of raw milk (Kurtz, 2015). This act 
outraged supporters of the food sovereignty movement, which built awareness and encouraged 
the spread of the ordinance across the state. In 2017, the Maine legislature passed and signed into 
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law An Act to Recognize Local Control Regarding Food Systems (also referred to as the Maine 
Food Sovereignty Act, or LD 725), which recognizes the right of a Maine municipality to adopt 
and enforce its own FSO, and exempts “food products that are grown, produced or processed by 
individuals within that municipality who sell directly to consumers” from state law (Maine Food 
Sovereignty Act, 2017).  
Figure 1.2. Adoption of a Local Food Sovereignty Ordinance in Maine 
Data provided by LocalFoodRules.org   
 
Levels of Selection. At the individual level, the adoption of the FSO is supported by local food 
consumers and producers who wish to deregulate the industry. High input costs and low profit 
margins have motivated small-scale farms to support the ordinance, which frees them from 
4800000
4900000
5000000
5100000
5200000
4e+05 5e+05 6e+05
long
lat
2012
2014
2016
2018
Adoption Date
Maine municipalities
Food sovereignty ordinance adoption 2011−2018
Blue Hill
Hope
Penobscot
Sedgwick
Trenton
Appleton
Livermore
Plymouth
Brooksville
Isle au Haut
Brooklin
Alexander 
Bingham
Freedom
Moscow
Solon
Liberty
Madison
Auburn
Canton
Eliot
Greenwood
Machias
Anson
Athens
Buckfield
Bucksport
Chapman
Chesterville
Fairfield
Georgetown
Jonesport
Lebanon
Montville
Moose River
Mount Vernon
Newburgh
Northport
Orland
Parkman
Phillips
Rockland
Starks
Wade
Westmanland
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Adoption year
M
unicipality
Miles
0 20 40 80
N
F od	sovereignty	ordinance	adoption	2011-2018
Maine	municipalities
	
16 
costly state regulations. Those who do not support the ordinance include citizens concerned with 
food safety aspects as well as producers who follow current rules and would like others to do the 
same. Large dairy producers including The Maine Cheese Guild has opposed various food 
sovereignty measures due to their high standards and emphasis on quality (Dowling, 2013). 
Local food patrons and activists are motivated to support the ordinance because it aims to build a 
stronger local food system throughout the state by lowering the costs of food production. At the 
municipal level, adoption of the ordinance is supported by social learning and cultural group 
transmission between towns, due in large part to campaign efforts by the grassroots organization 
Local Food Rules. This is evident in the spatial diffusion of the ordinance, where towns in close 
proximity appeared to adopt the ordinance around the same time (see Figure 1.2). County-level 
courts have not supported the ordinance in previous legal decisions. The FSO failed to prevent 
the Hancock County Superior Court from issuing an injunction against Mr. Dan Brown for 
distributing raw milk without a license in Blue Hill, which had adopted the ordinance in 2011 
(Kurtz, 2015).  
The confines of the state legal system appear to have selected against the ordinance at the 
level of the Maine state judiciary. As a result, the ordinance was deemed unconstitutional by the 
Maine Supreme Court in 2014 (State of Maine v. Dan Brown, 2014). The municipal ordinance 
failed to protect Mr. Brown from an injunction first issued by the county court, and later affirmed 
by the state court. However, support for the ordinance at the state level changed directions when 
the legislature passed the Maine Food Sovereignty Act with bipartisan support, which was signed 
into law by Governor Paul LePage in 2017. This act recognizes the right of towns to enforce 
food sovereignty ordinances under Maine’s home rule authority ("The Maine Food Sovereignty 
Act", 2017). Maine legislators supported this bill due to widespread enthusiasm among 
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constituents for the municipal ordinance, which diffused from the municipal level to the state 
level via cultural group transmission. The passage of the 2017 act created a powerful institutional 
change, evident in the 22 municipal ordinance adoptions which followed in 2018, representing 
nearly half of all adoptions since inception of the ordinance in 2011 (see Figure 2). This is an 
excellent example of multi-directional policy spread, from municipal to state level, and from 
state to municipal level. As a result, adoption of the ordinance created a positive feedback: towns 
adopted the ordinance, and the state formally recognized it, in turn encouraging more towns to 
adopt the ordinance.  
Summary. Maine’s municipal food sovereignty ordinance is a strong example of local 
adaptation in the face of institutional challenges. What began as a small, grassroots movement of 
small farmers and local food patrons grew and became strong enough to spread across 
municipalities, ultimately reversing the direction of state policy on the issue. The diffusion of 
this policy across municipalities and multiple levels of governance created a positive feedback 
mechanism, in which support for ordinance adoption at the municipal level is amplified by 
support at the state level.  
Discussion & Conclusions 
These two case studies have demonstrated the spread of local food policy over time and 
space across multiple levels of governance, using an evolutionary framework to illustrate the 
mechanisms involved in the policy diffusion process. The cases of cottage food and food 
sovereignty tell the story of the emergence and spread of local food autonomy laws in the U.S. 
The spread of cottage food laws gained momentum in the 1990s, around the time of the inception 
of the food sovereignty movement. While these laws vary, they generally exempt small, in-home 
food production of shelf-stable items (e.g. jams, baked goods, candies, etc.) from state food 
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safety regulations and licensure. The right of states to control intrastate commerce, growing 
demand for local food, and harsh economic conditions have played a role in determining the 
selection pressure in favor of the adoption of cottage food laws at the individual, group, and state 
levels. As a result of this pressure to adopt across multiple levels, the spread of cottage food laws 
in the U.S. has become a strong example of how policies can spread and diffuse rapidly given the 
right conditions.  
 Building on the food sovereignty movement, the state of Maine recently experienced the 
widespread adoption and diffusion of a municipal food sovereignty ordinance, which exempts 
the direct farm-to-consumer sale of eggs, dairy, produce and other perishables from compliance 
with state regulations and licensure. Individual-level pressure in favor of the FSO has helped it 
spread, as patrons and farmers alike benefit from the deregulation of local foods, which lowers 
the costs of production. Social learning and group transmission between towns was also 
important in the FSO’s spread. While legal constraints and precedent challenged the FSO at the 
state level, where it was struck down in 2014 (State of Maine v. Dan Brown) by the Maine 
Supreme Court, the diffusion of the FSO eventually led to the state’s adoption of the Maine Food 
Sovereignty Act (LD 725), recognizing the right of towns to adopt ordinances and reversing the 
direction of state-level pressure. The diffusion of the FSO to the state level created a positive 
feedback in which town-level selection was amplified after the passage of LD 725.  
 One limitation of this analysis is that, without data on industry outcomes (e.g. profits, 
survival rates, and other success measures), it is not possible to determine whether or not these 
policies are actually being selected for, and hence whether or not they are truly adaptive. 
Alternatively, evidence suggests that these case studies may be examples of non-adaptive drift, 
with traits being copied and transmitted randomly. Some evidence has emerged to suggest that 
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cottage food laws have allowed the industry to thrive and grow (McDonald, 2017; Sibilla, 2019), 
but the case of Maine’s food sovereignty ordinance has yet to be analyzed ex-post. Only time 
and data will tell if these policies result in the strengthening of local food organizations and 
institutions or not.  
 The implementation of an evolutionary framework in policy analysis can help us 
understand not only how policies spread, but also the conditions which help or hinder the 
diffusion of policies across multiple levels of governance. Tools from evolutionary social science 
allow us to identify the dominant levels and direction of selection, so that policymakers can 
potentially alter selection pressures to change outcomes. For example, identifying where high 
costs of adoption are likely to impede the spread of certain policies is helpful in developing 
incentives. Maine is currently experiencing the spread of municipal plastic bans, which prohibit 
the use of single-use plastic in restaurants and retail outlets (Abbate, 2018). One thing activists 
and policymakers might consider in this case is the direction of selection at different levels, 
which might draw attention to the extra costs to businesses this policy poses, and how those costs 
might be mitigated. Paying attention to transmission also becomes important when working for 
political change, as the Local Food Rules organization did when it pushed for the adoption of the 
municipal food sovereignty ordinance in Maine. Further, an evolutionary analysis is particularly 
useful in making predictions about how policies might spread in the future. For example, now 
that Maine has become the first state to adopt food sovereignty legislation, we might expect to 
see states like Vermont, New York, and other early adopters of cottage food laws experience the 
spread of food sovereignty legislation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CAPTURING COOPERATION IN FOOD BUYING CLUBS:  
AN EVOLUTIONARY CASE STUDY 
Cooperation & the Evolution of Organizations 
Despite the perpetual incentive for individuals to free-ride, the human ability to leverage 
cooperation in groups has allowed our species to dominate the Earth’s ecosystem (Henrich, 
2015). Cooperation, defined in game-theoretic terms, is an act that benefits others. It is 
distinguished from altruism, defined as an act of cooperation resulting in a net loss for the actor. 
Cooperation itself is not favored by natural selection unless specific mechanisms are at work 
(Rand & Nowak, 2013). This is because social dilemmas, scenarios in which the interests of the 
individual are in conflict with those of the group, present an incentive for individual group 
members to free-ride by reaping the benefits of the group without contributing (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). Cooperation is necessary in order to solve social dilemmas, 
which are present in many contexts but often play a central role in sustainability challenges, as 
noted by Hardin’s (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. The challenge of managing free-
ridership is demonstrated mathematically by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a hypothetical scenario in 
which two players’ self-interested behavior fails to provide the highest total payoff (Camerer, 
2003). In the game, both players’ defection is considered the Nash equilibrium, a strategy in 
which no other player has anything to gain by changing their own play. This creates a perpetual 
grid-lock in which the two players continually defect. If an entire population adopts this strategy, 
it cannot be invaded by a mutant a cooperator, and defection becomes the evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS). While a cooperator cannot invade a group of defectors, a single defector may 
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invade a group of cooperators. This conundrum illustrates how strongly defection is favored over 
cooperation by the process of natural selection.    
The process of group selection, whereby natural selection acts at the level of the group, 
has allowed humans to become conditional cooperators, requiring specific mechanisms to 
stabilize and support cooperation. Those mechanisms include direct and indirect reciprocity, 
spatial selection, multilevel selection, and kin selection (Rand & Nowak, 2013). Social 
mechanisms, including reciprocity, reputation and social norms have been shown to be more 
powerful at promoting cooperation than material rewards (Kraft-Todd, Yoeli, Bhanot, & Rand, 
2015). Other factors which can help stabilize cooperation include a small group size, repeated 
interactions, and punishment mechanisms (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016; D.S. Wilson, Elinor Ostrom, 
& Michael E. Cox, 2013).  
In order for cooperation to be stabilized enough to actually resolve social dilemmas, the 
pressure to cooperate must be stronger than the pressure to free-ride. In essence, group-level 
selection must dominate individual-level selection. This happens when intergroup competition 
(e.g. war and raiding, differential group survival, migration, reproduction, and prestige-based 
group transmission) drives cooperation (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016; D.S. Wilson, Elinor Ostrom, & 
Michael E. Cox, 2013). These various mechanisms of intergroup competition drive the evolution 
of institutions, rules and norms which support cooperation. Ostrom’s (1990) institutional 
solutions to support cooperation and manage common-pool resources are well studied, and have 
been identified as useful for groups in contexts outside of natural resource management (Wilson 
& Gowdy, 2013). Intergroup competition also drives the evolution of organizations, defined as 
specific types of institutions with clearly-defined boundaries, principles of sovereignty, and a 
hierarchy of responsibility (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). Competition motivates organizations to 
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seek out the best solutions to improve performance, and their subsequent successes and failures 
result in learning, which then triggers learning in rival organizations (Barnett & Hansen, 1996). 
This selection process creates conditions in which more cooperative organizations outperform 
and outlive less cooperative ones, ultimately driving the evolution of organizations.   
Cooperation in Cooperatives 
This research is concerned with the evolution of a special type of organization: the 
consumer food cooperative. Cooperatively-structured firms are distinguished from traditional, 
hierarchical firms in that they are typically member-owned and controlled democratically (ICA, 
2015), and may even rely on cooperation to survive (Fulton, 1990). Experimental evidence has 
shown that customers of cooperatives exhibit a higher base level of cooperation than shoppers at 
a traditional grocery (Tremblay, Hupper, & Waring, 2019). The cooperative structure has been 
criticized for being less efficient and less profitable than hierarchical firms. However, such 
arguments often ignore the niche role of cooperatives in counteracting market failure (Nilsson, 
2001). For example, cooperatives have demonstrated resilience and even growth during times of 
economic downturn (Birchall & Ketilson, 2009; Craig & Pencavel, 1992). This resilience is 
likely the result of the cooperative structure, emphasizing collective decision-making and 
inclusive solutions to support members and their communities. However, the cooperative 
structure does pose a social dilemma that requires members to cooperate (Fulton, 1990). 
Cooperatives’ reliance on cooperation motivates an investigation into the mechanisms by which 
these organizations have evolved to maintain cooperation and thrive in niche markets.  
 Due to the underlying social dilemma, cooperatives must manage the problem of free-
ridership to be successful (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2016). Cooperatives often use a set of guidelines 
which originated in England in the 1840s and have spread to become common among different 
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types of cooperatives (ICA, 2015). There are a total of seven principles for successful co-
operative management, including (1) Voluntary and open membership, (2) Democratic member 
control, (3) Member economic participation, (4) Autonomy and independence, (5) Education, 
training and information, (6) Cooperation among cooperatives, and (7) Concern for community 
(ICA, 2015). Some work has noted similarities between the co-op principles and Ostrom’s 
institutional design principles (Lund, 2011), which have been identified as highly applicable to 
cooperatives (Gupta, 2014). Not unlike the design principles, the historical record suggests that 
the co-op principles are a set of institutional adaptations which emerged as a result of selection 
on organizational structure, as well as descent with modification which helped co-ops thrive and 
spread (Waring & Lange, 2019). The current study of small-scale, informal cooperative 
purchasing groups will aid in the understanding of how these adaptations emerged and what role 
they play in stabilizing cooperation within an organizational context.  
Consumer Food Cooperatives 
Cooperative businesses take many forms; they can be worker-owned, producer-owned, or 
consumer-owned, and vary greatly by mission and industry. This research focuses on small 
consumer food cooperatives, which are owned and operated by consumers and operate in retail 
settings. Food buying clubs are informal food cooperatives which arise when individuals 
convene to use their collective purchasing power to obtain bulk quantities of food at per-unit 
prices lower than offered by traditional grocers, or specialty items which cannot be found 
elsewhere. Food buying clubs order directly from wholesalers and local producers, removing the 
middleman and allowing members more control over their desired goods and means of provision 
(Herrmann, 1993). Many food buying clubs seek to purchase primarily organic, local, non-GMO, 
sustainable, fair trade, and rare or ethnic food items, in addition to a number of natural and 
	
24 
organic household and personal care products offered by some larger distributors like United 
Natural Foods, Inc. (UNFI) and Frontier Co-op. Many buying clubs use online catalogs to collate 
orders, a more efficient method than using paper order books or manually entering orders into 
spreadsheets. While much of these clubs’ activity occurs online, members typically meet in 
person to break down and distribute orders biweekly or monthly, and some clubs have annual or 
semi-annual meetings.  
Buying clubs vary in size and formality – some are very large with complex sets of rules 
and requirements, while others are relatively small and informal. Successful buying clubs which 
are able to overcome the problem of free-ridership may eventually grow and transition to formal 
cooperative stores or “food co-ops,” physical storefronts which market and sell products to 
consumers directly. While co-ops are certainly more formal than buying clubs, they retain group-
level attributes similar to their informal predecessors, including formal membership, collective 
governance, and work-sharing (ICA, 2015).  
Buying Clubs & Cooperation 
The structure of buying clubs likely requires members to cooperate with one another, 
both organizationally and economically (Tremblay & Waring, 2015). Unlike traditional food 
buying venues, buying clubs require a significant amount of work and energy from members to 
be sustained. Most clubs are run by a single coordinator, who oversees the group and may solicit 
help from members in breaking down orders, bookkeeping, hosting meetings, submitting orders 
to vendors, greeting a delivery truck, managing surplus items, managing new members, and 
other tasks. These tasks require members to donate time and labor for the benefit of the group, as 
opposed to online retailers or traditional storefronts which offer greater convenience. The 
amount of organizational cooperation required by clubs can sometimes be too costly for 
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prospective members. In one phone interview I conducted with the coordinator of a club with 
detailed work requirements, the coordinator said, “plenty of people inquire [about the club], and 
are shown the FAQs (work tasks and job rotation), after which they often decide not to join.”  
In addition to work tasks, the nature of buying clubs requires members to cooperate 
economically by sharing purchases of bulk items. Shared purchases, or “splits,” happen when at 
least two club members contribute to the purchase of a bulk item which is to be divided and 
redistributed upon receipt. The challenge of coordinating and filling split orders is likely to 
require cooperation among club members when preferences diverge and members must purchase 
items they do not prefer in order to help others fill splits. In this case, members behave 
altruistically to help the group, versus simply coordinating to fill a split which is mutually 
agreeable when members’ preferences sufficiently overlap.  
 The organizational and economic cooperation required in buying clubs makes them 
difficult to operate and maintain, particularly in a broader natural food market that continues to 
offer greater levels of convenience and lower prices to consumers. While food buying clubs help 
members gain access to specialty items, they exist in competition with many other vendors 
including online retailers, farmers’ markets, natural food stores, and traditional grocery stores 
and supermarkets. This competition creates a harsh environment in which clubs operate, and 
makes them less resilient to external shocks than their formal competitors. As one club 
coordinator put it, “You have to be organized and plan [to be in the club]. Life happens, but 
being part of a food co-op2 is a conscious choice. Families need to eat but they don’t need to 
belong to a food co-op.” Buying clubs’ likely reliance on cooperation implies that group 
																																																						
2 I refer to the informal buying clubs as “groups” or “clubs” to avoid confusion with formal cooperative stores, 
however they are commonly referred to as “food co-ops” or “co-ops” by members.  
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selection via harsh environmental conditions (e.g. competition with other vendors) and 
exogenous shocks (e.g. loss of meeting space, coordinator leaving the group), will lead more 
cooperative clubs to outperform and outlive those which are less cooperative.  
Buying clubs may overcome these challenges by instituting adaptations which stabilize 
cooperation. Because many clubs require individuals to cooperate by performing work tasks and 
sharing purchases, they often struggle to manage free-ridership. One adaptation clubs may use to 
support cooperation is reciprocity, or the expectation that kind acts will be rewarded (Trivers, 
1971). Theoretical modeling suggests that buying clubs may rely on reciprocity. Tremblay 
(2017) shows that generalized reciprocity supports cooperation in buying clubs using an agent-
based model designed to simulate splitting behavior. This research builds upon Tremblay’s 
original findings by further examining the role reciprocity plays in maintaining buying club 
cooperation, function, and overall success.  
Another adaptation that may be important for stabilizing cooperation in buying clubs is 
the adoption of rules and requirements for club membership. Institutional design principles, like 
rules in buying clubs, can stabilize cooperation and help groups sustainably manage public goods 
(Ostrom, 1990). In buying clubs, such rules may help distribute responsibility evenly among 
members, preventing individuals from free-riding on coordinator efforts. Consistent with Waring 
and Lange’s (2019) finding that cooperatives have been able to overcome adaptive challenges by 
adopting a set of management principles, it is likely that similar adaptations may also be 
observed in buying clubs, the informal precursor of co-ops. If cooperation is as important for 
cooperatives as suggested by theory, then it should be possible to measure it in food buying 
clubs.  
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Hypothesis & Predictions 
Over their lives, clubs will face many challenges. Some of these challenges include 
soliciting help from members, distributing work tasks fairly, reaching order minimums, filling 
splits, managing ordering cycles, and other organizational challenges. I hypothesize that groups 
which adapt to these challenges will outperform those who do not, as they will be more resilient 
when facing harsh economic conditions and exogenous shocks. Key adaptations that may help 
clubs succeed include maintaining strong reciprocity between members and adopting formal 
rules to sustain cooperation.  
Figure 2.1. Adaptive Process of Food Buying Clubs. 
	
I explore the impact of club reciprocity and rules on various measures of success. 
Reciprocity and rules are expected to help reduce group reliance on generous individuals by 
encouraging members to cooperate with one another. More reciprocal and more formal clubs are 
expected to be more functional than less reciprocal, less formal clubs, because reciprocity and 
institutions support cooperation. Finally, if reciprocity and rules are organizational adaptations, 
they should be more prevalent in older clubs, given the evolutionary implication that less 
reciprocal and less formal clubs would be selected out of the population.  
Prediction 1. Due to the cooperative structure of buying clubs, members will be 
cooperative toward their groups.  
Prediction 2. Buying clubs will exercise reciprocity through order-sharing. 
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Prediction 3. Reciprocity will help clubs succeed. Specifically, 
A. Reciprocity will reduce the need for altruism & support (non-altruistic) 
cooperation in clubs. 
B. Reciprocity will promote club functionality. 
C. Older clubs will be more reciprocal. 
Prediction 4. The adoption of rules will help clubs succeed. Specifically, 
A. Rules will reduce the need for altruism & support (non-altruistic) cooperation 
in clubs. 
B. Rules will promote club functionality. 
C. Rules will help clubs survive.  
Methods 
This research3 observes a group of food buying clubs subscribed to two online ordering 
services, BuyingClubSoftware, Inc. (BCS) and Foodclub.org (Foodclub). Access to buying club 
data was made possible through partnerships between the research team and the owners of these 
two services, Mr. Jeremy Bloom (of BCS) and Mr. Adi Fairbank (of Foodclub), who obtained 
permission from groups before granting the research team access to club data. The team also 
received multiple approvals from the University of Maine’s Institutional Review Board before 
soliciting or viewing any human subject data via the clubs’ purchasing history, online surveys, 
and phone interviews. A total of 48 buying clubs (2,951 total individuals) are represented in the 
purchasing data from BCS and Foodclub combined. Of those 48, 14 clubs (177 total individuals) 
																																																						
3 This thesis is one component of a larger research program funded by National Science Foundation CAREER grant SES-
1352361 to Dr. Timothy Waring. This project calls upon the work of many former and current researchers, namely Mr. Ethan 
Tremblay, Mr. Taylor Lange, Mr. Antonio Jurlina, and myself. 
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are represented in survey data, with seven from BCS and seven from Foodclub. Interviews with 
eight coordinators and one member represent seven clubs from Foodclub, and one from BCS.  
Table 2.1. Buying Club Study Sample Sizes. 
Software Groups/people Purchase data Survey Experiment Interview 
BCS groups 29 7 7 0 
BCS people 2,524 94 DG: 93; PGG: 90 1 
Foodclub groups 19 7 7 7 
Foodclub people 427 83 83 8 
All groups 48 14 14 8 
All people 2,951 177 173 9 
 
Coordinator Interviews 
A major component of this research is concerned with the organizational environment of 
food buying clubs. This thesis follows up on previous work which analyzed data collected in a 
survey of BuyingClubSoftware, Inc. groups (Hupper, 2017). In the original BCS survey, club 
coordinators were prompted to answer a set of questions separate from the main survey, 
regarding the history, structure, and organization of their club. Many of these questions were 
designed to measure whether and to what extent groups implement similar versions of Ostrom’s 
(1990) institutional design principles in their organization. After analyzing results from the first 
survey, it was decided that in order to gain a richer understanding of how clubs operate, the 
coordinators should be interviewed. A round of semi-structured phone interviews with Foodclub 
coordinators replaced the coordinator section of the original online survey, effectively shortening 
and simplifying it for respondents. Further, establishing trust and personal connections with 
coordinators over the phone before undertaking a full examination of the clubs improved the 
quality of data collected from Foodclub groups.  
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 Phone interviews with club coordinators were conducted in the summer of 2018. 
Interviews were scheduled via email, and coordinators were informed that the interview would 
be helpful to their club, confidential, and take about 30 minutes to complete. When coordinators 
answered the phone, the interviewer read a statement of informed consent prior to beginning the 
interview and asked if the subject was willing to participate. Consent was provided by answering 
“yes” verbally. Interviews were not recorded on any devices, but notes were taken on the 
computer by the interviewer while questions were being answered. The interview template used 
contains 17 questions, including sections on club history, group function, order-sharing, member 
contributions, integration of Ostrom’s design principles4, and the club’s biggest challenges and 
successes over the years (see Appendix A). The interview concludes by asking permission for 
the research team to access the club’s purchasing history, as well as permission to share the 
online survey with the club. All coordinators interviewed agreed to both requests.   
 When compared to survey responses, the richness of interview dialogue allows for a 
greater level of precision when classifying qualitative data into quantitative variables. After 
reviewing interview notes, a new dataset was generated by compiling the number of active 
members, club age in years, and number of rules adopted. This club-level dataset is a key 
element of multilevel analysis, providing a source of variation among clubs.  
Online Surveys 
This research combines data from two online surveys, one conducted from 2016-2017 
with BCS groups5 (located in the US), and the second survey was implemented in 2018 with 
																																																						
4 Principle eight (nested enterprises) was not included in the interview questions because I find it does not apply as 
well to small, informal groups like buying clubs as the first seven design principles do.  
5 See Hupper (2017) for full details of the original survey 
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Foodclub groups (located in New England). Of the 16 active Foodclub groups whose contact 
information was made available to the team, seven coordinators agreed to have their club 
participate. Qualtrics Survey Software was used to build the survey and generate a unique URL 
for each club, which coordinators shared via email with members. Members were informed that 
the survey is built to help their club by providing key information for diagnostic and buying club 
“health” reports, includes a paid economic game, will provide high-participation clubs with $100 
off their Foodclub.org fees, is fully confidential, and takes roughly 15 minutes to complete.  
 The original BCS survey was revised and shortened to create a new, 32-question survey 
for Foodclub groups. Many questions were shortened and restructured for clarity and brevity, 
and others were removed for being less useful to the goals of the research than originally 
anticipated. Reused questions include the dictator and public goods games, percent of household 
needs met through the club, percent of the time members help others fill splits (assistance given), 
percent of the time members are helped by others in splits (assistance received), Likert scale 
questions regarding club communication, member contributions, member benefits, overall club 
function, and club satisfaction, as well as suggestions for club improvement, and demographic 
variables6. A handful of new questions were also added (see Appendix B), but these variables 
have been excluded from the dataset in order to preserve the full sample of BCS and Foodclub 
groups for analysis.  
 The Foodclub survey was launched in mid-July, 2018 and ran through the end of 
September, 2018, collecting a total of 83 complete responses (see Table 2.1). After closing the 
survey, respondents were compensated via the Cash App with payments based on the outcome of 
																																																						
6 All demographic questions from the original survey were preserved except household size and number of 
household earners. This is because the number of household dependents is likely to be a more relevant indicator of a 
member’s reliance on their buying club than household size or number of earners.  
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the two economic games played. High-participating clubs were compensated with a $100 credit 
to their Foodclub account. In order to prepare the BCS and Foodclub survey data for analysis, 
.CSV files were exported from Qualtrics and cleaned using the software R. Packages used in this 
process include ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, Henry, & RStudio, 2018), ‘dplyr’ (Wickham, Francois, 
Henry, Müller, & RStudio, 2018), and ‘readr’ (Wickham, Hester, et al., 2018). After cleaning, 
CSVs of each dataset were generated and merged manually. Club-level data for BCS groups was 
gathered by reviewing coordinator survey responses to determine club age, size, and number of 
rules. Although this method of extraction doesn’t match the accuracy and nuance of interview 
data, it provides the second-best insight into how the clubs are structured. The final dataset used 
for analysis includes 164 observations and 13 variables.  
Experimental Economic Games  
In keeping with the structure of the original BCS survey, the Foodclub survey begins by 
presenting respondents with two experimental economic games. The first is a one-shot dictator 
game, designed to measure individual-to-individual altruism or unenforced fairness (Camerer, 
2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). In this version of the game, the respondent (the 
dictator) is presented with an initial endowment of $8 and given the option to donate any whole-
dollar amount of that endowment ($0-$8) to the next player (the recipient) who is identified as an 
anonymous member of the respondent’s buying club (see Figure 2.1). The dictator also serves as 
the anonymous recipient in round two (i.e. when another respondent acts as the dictator). The 
respondent’s total compensation is therefore equal to the amount of the initial endowment kept 
while acting as the dictator, plus the amount received when acting as the recipient for another 
dictator.   
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Figure 2.2. Dictator Game Setup. 
 
 After completing the dictator game, respondents are presented with a one-shot public 
goods game, which is designed to measure individual-to-group cooperation (Camerer, 2003; 
Davis & Holt, 1993). This version of the game has a setup similar to the dictator game, except 
that respondents are given the option to donate any whole-dollar amount of their $8 endowment 
($0-$8) to a collective fund for their buying club instead of a single anonymous individual. The 
group fund then sums all donations, multiplies them by 1.4, and distributes them evenly among 
players (see Figure 2.3). The respondents are then compensated with the remaining amount of 
the endowment they chose to keep, plus the payoff from the pooled group fund.  
Figure 2.3. Public Goods Game Setup. 
 
Dictator Recipient$8
DonationInitial	
endowment $4
Keeps	$4
Total Payoffs: $4 $4
Player 2
Player 3
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Player 1
Pooled club
contributions
$15 x 1.4 = $21
$8
$8
$8
$8 (kept $0)
$9
$7
Initial
endowment Donation Payoff Total payoff
$7
$14
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Summary of Interview, Survey & Experimental Data 
A total of eight coordinators and one founding member agreed to participate in phone 
interviews, representing a total of seven Foodclub groups (see Table 2.1 for a full summary of 
data collection) and one BCS group that had disbanded. For Foodclub groups, all except for 
clubs F1, F5 and F6 achieved 100 survey percent participation among members7.  
Figure 2.4. Survey Response Rates8. 
 
Interview & Survey Data Analysis 
Interview and survey results include both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative 
data are analyzed by searching for patterns in the responses relevant to research predictions. 
Interviews and surveys were coded on categories such as club age, size, number of rules, etc. A 
club-level dataset of quantitative data from surveys and interviews was constructed for formal 
																																																						
7 It is possible that more than one member of some households took the survey. Some manage two separate accounts 
but typically order from one main account. This might impact the “true” response rate from clubs. However, this 
cannot be determined from the data, and usernames which are present in the survey but not in the purchase data are 
dropped from the analysis.  
8 Club names are not revealed in order to protect the identities of research participants. Club IDs were assigned to 
each group, and chosen based on whether the group is subscribed to Foodclub (F) or BCS (B). Numerical rankings 
were chosen based on observed group size, with larger clubs ranked lower and smaller clubs ranked higher.		
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analysis, with variables including club age, size, number of rules, average game contributions, 
and averages of individual survey measures including satisfaction with club, overall club 
function, even distribution of work tasks (member contributions), help given to others to 
complete splits, and help received from others to complete splits.  
Results 
Overview of Qualitative Results  
Phone interviews with club coordinators and qualitative survey responses reveal rich 
information about some of the key challenges buying clubs face as they grow and age. Results 
support the prediction that buying clubs require two major types of cooperation to function: 
economic cooperation (order-sharing) and organizational cooperation (work-sharing). Sharing 
bulk purchases is an important function of many clubs. As one coordinator said, “Foodclub’s big 
feature is the splits – it is essential to what we do.” Many coordinators praised Foodclub and 
BCS for providing an easy platform to coordinate and organize orders, particularly with split 
items which “were very time consuming” before the software was available. However, club size 
can limit the amount of splitting clubs can do, which is a problem faced by nearly all groups in 
our study. When asked about a “sweet spot” in terms of club size, many coordinators gave a 
number between 20 and 25 people, a range substantially larger than the average club size in our 
study, which is about 15. Clubs often struggle to recruit enough regularly ordering members to 
reach order minimums and gain access to a variety of items. As one coordinator stated, “more 
people on splits creates a greater variety of products, due to more varied preferences.” Another 
coordinator mentioned that “50 percent of splits end up failing” because the club is too small to 
fill bulk orders. Some coordinators mentioned having to purchase surplus items to help the group 
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reach order minimums and achieve splits, and one club in particular had to merge with another 
club to gain enough members to be able to place an order every month.   
Equally as important as splits, if not more, is group membership. As one coordinator 
explained, “splits are not the most important feature (not all vendors require splits), the 
community is – lots of people have made friends and are like-minded.” Having a sufficient 
number of motivated members also help clubs accomplish necessary work tasks, because “a 
smaller pool of members creates more work for everyone.” Clubs are fundamentally challenged 
with optimizing membership based on split and order needs, work tasks, and overall efficiency. 
Finding and recruiting members can be tough, as some groups have experienced “a lack of 
members wanting to take the time to participate.” Depending on the club, the necessary 
contributions (i.e. sharing work tasks) can discourage potential new members. When asked about 
problems faced by their clubs, many survey respondents mentioned something along the lines of 
“not enough people to fill splits,” “getting all members engaged and committed” and needing 
“more members to share the work.”  
One way clubs are able to recruit help from members and distribute work tasks more 
fairly is by establishing rules and norms to support cooperation. The number of rules adopted by 
the clubs in our study ranges from one to six (see Table 2.2). Some rules are formal and 
enforced, while others are informal social norms. The most common rules include requiring 
members to 1) complete their designated work task, 2) attend meetings, 3) pay an annual 
membership fee, 4) pay a service fee on orders to cover operating costs, 5) bring money to 
breakdown meetings, 6) pick up their order on time, 7) be willing to help with breakdown, and 8) 
help the coordinator break down large bulk orders. Common designated work tasks include 
bookkeeping, collating orders, organizing breakdown meetings, managing invoices, picking up 
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foods from local vendors, meeting the delivery truck, and weighing, counting and measuring 
split items at breakdown meetings. Most clubs allow members to sign up for jobs voluntarily, 
and some have a rotating job schedule. 
Table 2.2. Summary of Club-Level Data  
Club ID Club age in 
years 
Number of active 
members9 
Number of 
rules adopted 
B1 13 27 1 
B2 10 25 3 
B3 4 20 4 
B4 6 20 4 
B5 8 11 3 
B6 7 11 4 
B7 7 8 6 
F1 29 38 4 
F2 30 17 6 
F3 36 12 5 
F4 7 8 3 
F5 3 7 2 
F6 2 5 1 
F7 3 3 1 
Average 11.8 15.1 3.4 
Median 7 11.5 3.5 
 
Experimental Games Results  
The following results were obtained from two experimental economic games played in 
online surveys with food buying club members in 2016 and 2018. The dictator game measures 
individual-to-individual altruism or unenforced fairness, and the public goods game measures 
individual-to-group cooperation (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3 for game structures). Figures 2.5 and 
2.6 provide a distribution of donations for each game. 
 
																																																						
9 Active members are defined as those who use BuyingClubSoftware or Foodclub.org regularly. This number may 
underestimate the true size of the club, as some members choose to purchase from other ordering platforms, but 
those individuals cannot be observed in the data.  
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Figure 2.5. Dictator Game Donations. Figure 2.6. Public Goods Game Donations.
                    
The average percent of endowment donated in the dictator game was $4.67, and the average 
percent of endowment donated in the public goods game was $5.61 (see Table 2.3). The dictator 
game typically produces a tri-modal distribution with donations primarily centered on the 
minimum, median and max, in descending order (Engel, 2011). Here I observe very few 
donations at the minimum ($0), with the most common choice at the median ($4) and the next 
most common choice at the max ($8). The public goods game also typically follows a tri-modal 
distribution similar to that of the dictator game, but these results follow the reverse pattern with 
few donations at the min ($0) and most at the max ($8).   
Table 2.3. Experimental Game Summary Statistics. 
 Dictator game Public goods game 
Mean donation $4.67 $5.61 
Mean % of endowment donated 58% 71% 
Standard deviation 1.83 2.49 
Sample size 176 173 
 
One way to analyze the dictator and public goods game results is to compare them to 
those of other studies. Such games are widely used in academic literature, although study design 
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can differ slightly. To gain a sense of where these results fall in comparison to other populations, 
I conduct a meta-analysis of studies that implement similar versions of the dictator and public 
goods games with various groups and individuals. The types of groups studied across this 
literature ranges from small-scale societies and indigenous groups to college students belonging 
to Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies (Norenzayan, 
Henrich, & Heine, 2010).  
I compare our results to a total of eight similar studies. Six of those studies provide 
enough information to perform a test of differences in proportions, while two are meta-analyses 
and only provide a study-wide mean. Lamba & Mace (2011), Leider et al. (2009), and Paciotti et 
al. (2011) each reported the standard deviation, mean and sample size directly. Data generated by 
Eckel & Grossman (1998) had to be recreated and analyzed manually using a summary of data. 
Apicella et al. (2012) only provided the sample size and standard error, which was used to 
calculate the standard deviation manually. Henrich et al. (2001) only reported a mean and sample 
size, but was still included for calculating the percent change in means. Engel (2011) and  
Zelmer (2003) are meta-analyses and only provide the mean percent of endowment donated. 
Many other studies were examined but ultimately excluded from analysis because they involve 
iterated games, which invoke different interpretations than one-shot games, as played in the 
current study (Henrich et al., 2010). Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide a full summary of comparison 
results. 
Table 2.4. Dictator Game Meta-Analysis (One-Shot Games). 
Study Subject Sample size 
Mean % of 
endowment 
contributed 
% change 
(this study) t-value p-value 
This study 
food buying 
clubs 
176 58%    
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Table 2.4 continued. 
Paciotti et al., 
2011 
Community 
groups 
183 48% +21% 3.49 < 0.001 
Leider et al., 
2009 
WEIRD 
students 
(friends) 
181 38% +53% 10.78 < 0.001 
Engel, 2011* Mixed 
129 
studies 
28% +107%   
Eckel & 
Grossman, 1998 
WEIRD 
students 
(women) 
60 16% +263% 23.44 < 0.001 
Eckel & 
Grossman, 1998 
WEIRD 
students (men) 
60 8% +625% 28.01 < 0.001 
 
The mean percent of endowment contributed in the dictator game in this study is larger than all 
other means analyzed, and statistically significantly greater than results from all other studies 
analyzed with a t-test. The mean dictator game donation closest to that of the current study is 48 
percent (community groups), while the mean donation farthest from that of the current study is 8 
percent (male students).  
Table 2.5. Public Goods Game Meta-Analysis (One-Shot Games). 
 
Study Subject Sample size 
Mean % of 
endowment 
contributed 
% change 
(this study) t-value p-value 
This study food buying clubs 173 71%    
Henrich et al., 
2001 Orma (Kenya) 24 58% +22%   
Apicella et al., 
2012 
Hadza (x310) 
(Tanzania) 205 57% +25% 6.60 < 0.001 
Lamba & Mace, 
2011 
Pahari Korwa 
(India) 301 52% +37% 12.02 < 0.001 
Zelmer, 2003* WEIRD  students 
27  
studies 38% +87%   
																																																						
10 The Hadza bands played public goods games with a multiplier of 300% 
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The mean percent of endowment contributed in the public goods game in the current study is 
larger than all other means analyzed, and statistically significantly greater than results from all 
other similar studies analyzed with a t-test. The mean public goods game donation closest to that 
of the current study is 58 percent donated by the Orma people, while the farthest mean is thirty-
eight percent donated by students. Overall, these results provide support for prediction 1 by 
showing increased cooperation among buying club members compared to other populations.  
Scientific Questions & Data Structure 
 This research is primarily concerned with answering the question of how buying clubs 
might adapt to the challenges they face. To address my predictions, I will examine how group-
level structures influence both individual and group-level outcomes. For this purpose, the data 
collected follow a hierarchical structure, containing individual (member) and group (club) 
characteristics. A common statistical approach used to analyze this type of data is a hierarchical 
linear model (HLM), which estimates random slopes and/or intercepts for each grouping class 
assigned. HLMs are designed to resolve non-independence within nested classes of data, and has 
the ability to control for between-group variation which may impact individual-level data. The 
following analyses will take a broad-to-narrow approach, first by summarizing the amount of 
variation explained by each group, then by estimating a series of random effect models to explain 
the effects of individual and group-level explanatory variables on dependent variables of interest. 
Summary of Data by Club 
 The following scatterplots illustrate how data from a handful of survey questions vary 
across groups. Points have been jittered to show the density of observations at the value, and the 
black diamonds represent means for each club. The following plots summarize four individual-
level dependent variables including dictator game donation (in $), public goods game donation 
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(in $), reciprocity in shared purchases, and overall club function (measure of perceived club 
function). Reciprocity is calculated by subtracting the percent of the time members report giving 
assistance in splits from the percent of the time they report receiving assistance to others (net 
received or NR). This calculation centers perfectly balanced reciprocity (giving the same amount 
as receiving) at zero, with negative scores indicating altruistic behavior (giving more than 
receiving) and positive scores indicating free-riding behavior (giving less than receiving). 
Figure 2.7. DG Donations by Club.                          Figure 2.8. PGG Donations by Club.  
        
         
  Figure 2.9. Net Received by Club.                            Figure 2.10. Overall Function by Club.  
  
 
Hierarchical Linear Model Specification 
 HLMs not only control for individual and between-group differences, but also provide a 
measure of variation in the data explained across levels. While I control for individual-level 
differences using data collected in the survey (demographics, etc.), I am primarily interested in 
how differences are explained between groups, and what the group-level characteristics are that 
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drive those differences. I apply the random-intercept model, which allows group intercepts to 
vary but assumes fixed slopes across groups. While the random slope and intercept model is 
likely the most realistic, the random intercept model is simpler and best suited to examine the 
proportion of total variation explained by groups. I also employ an ANOVA for random-effects, 
which conducts a likelihood ratio test (LRT) on two models (with and without the random effect) 
to determine which of the two models best fits the data according to their log-likelihoods. The 
HLMs used in this thesis are of the form, 𝑌"# = 𝛽&# + 𝛽(#𝑋"# + 𝑒"#                                      Eq.1  𝛽&# = 𝛾&& + 𝛾&(𝑊# + 𝑢&#                   Eq. 2 
where 𝑌"# is a dependent variable, 𝛽&# is the level 2 intercept, 𝛽(# is the slope of relationship (in 
level 2) between level 1 predictor and dependent variable, 𝑋"# is the level 1 predictor variable, 
and 𝑒"# is the random error (level 1), 𝛾&& is the overall intercept (grand mean across groups), 𝛾&( 
is the overall regression coefficient, 𝑊# is the level 2 predictor (number of rules, reciprocity 
slope, etc.), and 𝑢&# random error (deviation of group from overall intercept).  
Individual control variables were chosen from game theory literature, which provides the 
expected sign for the effect of demographic variables on game donations. For the dictator game, 
females tend to donate more than males (Pan & Houser, 2011), wealthier individuals tend to 
donate less than less wealthy individuals (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), and older 
participants typically donate more than younger ones (Engel, 2011). In the public goods game, 
women tend to donate more than men (Nowell & Tinkler, 1994), older individuals tend to donate 
less than younger individuals (Rieger & Mata, 2015), and wealth has no significant effect on 
donations (Buckley & Croson, 2006). In order for models to converge, individual control 
variables were scaled so predictor means were centered to zero.   
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Percent of household needs met through the club, which captures the extent to which 
individuals rely on their club to meet their needs, was used as a control variable for all models. 
Individual reliance on and involvement in clubs may influence the way people feel and behave 
toward their group. For example, if one person meets 80 percent of their total household needs 
through the club, they may have an increased propensity to join in on split orders, compared to 
another person who only fills 20 percent of their needs. This key difference may also translate to 
experimental game outcomes, as the games were chosen for their ability to mimic the social 
context of order-sharing in the clubs. In addition, individuals who rely more on their club and are 
more involved might feel differently about certain measures of success (i.e. overall club 
function) than those who operate less frequently or are less invested.  
Table 2.6. Control Variable Summary Statistics. 
Control Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Age 157 51 50 13 22 79 
HH income ($K) 140 69 65 34 2 150 
% HH needs met 159 31 29 21 1 100 
Gender 156 141 F (90%), 14 M (9%), 1 other (0.6%) 
 
Table 2.7. Summary of HLM Results11. 
Prediction Ind. variable 
Dep. 
variable 
Effect 
size p-value 
% variance 
explained 
by club12 
LRT 
3A NR DG 0.00 0.70 0 0.00 
3A NR PGG 0.00 0.86 0 0.00 
3B NR Function 0.04 0.64 15 4.55* 
3C Club age NR 0.42 0.19 3 0.23 
3C Club size NR 0.58** 0.01 0 0.00 
																																																						
11 See Appendix C for full regression tables.  
12 Variance explained by club divided by total variance	
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Table 2.7 continued. 
4A # rules DG -0.20 0.20 13 4.59* 
4A # rules PGG 0.06 0.70 3 0.34 
4B # rules Function 2.81* 0.08 7 2.29 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01 
Evidence for P1: Buying Club Members Will Be Cooperative Toward Their Groups  
The self-interested Nash Equilibrium strategy predicted by rational choice in this game is 
a donation of zero. Instead, donations in the dictator game tend to be clustered around the median 
($4) and the max ($8). The range of average donations in this game was $4-$6. Clubs B1 and B7 
had the largest spread of data points from $0-$8. The mean donation was $4.67, or 58 percent of 
total endowment. Donations in the public goods game had a much larger spread, with most clubs 
exhibiting the full range from $0-$8. Overall, these data vary greatly in comparison to the 
dictator game donations, but all groups followed the general trend of donations clustering at the 
max. The mean donation in the public goods game was $5.61, or 70 percent of total endowment. 
These results, in combination with the findings from the meta-analysis, demonstrate that the 
buying club members in this study do behave cooperatively toward their groups. The analyses of 
game donations provide strong support for P1.   
Evidence for P2: Buying Club Members Will Exercise Reciprocity in Order-Sharing 
In the scatterplot of NR by club, points tended to be clustered around 0 (balanced 
reciprocity) with a good number of points from all groups dropping well below into the negative 
range (altruistic behavior). Only a handful of points landed in the positive range (free-riding 
behavior) from five clubs (B2, B2, B3, B5, and F1). Overall, people tended to report being 
altruists more frequently than being free-riders. The mean NR across survey respondents was 
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–10.60, and the standard deviation was 24.42. On average people reported that they exercise 
relatively balanced reciprocity, with a slight tendency to report giving more than receiving. 
These results indicate that clubs do exercise reciprocity in order-sharing, and that it varies 
between individuals and between clubs. 
Evidence for 3A: Reciprocity Will Reduce Altruism & Support Cooperation 
 In order to estimate the effect of reciprocity on altruism (DG) and cooperation (PGG), I 
estimate the effect of individual reciprocity (NR) on dictator and public goods game donations, 
controlling for age, income, gender, and percent of household needs met through the club, and 
allow intercepts to vary by club (see Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2). NR was not a significant 
predictor of donations in either game. For the both models of game donations, zero percent of the 
variance in the data can be explained by variation across clubs, and grouping by club does not 
significant predict game donations. These results do not provide any support for prediction 3A.  
Evidence for 3B: Reciprocity Will Promote Club Functionality 
I estimate an HLM of club overall function explained by percent of household needs met 
through the club and NR (see Appendix Table C.3). NR was not found to be a significant 
predictor of overall club function. Roughly 15 percent of the variation in club function can be 
explained by differences in between clubs, and grouping by club ID is a significant predictor of 
club function (LRT=4.55, p=0.03). These results do not support prediction 3B. 
Evidence for 3C: Older Clubs Will Be More Reciprocal 
 In order to examine the relationship between club age and reciprocity, I estimate an HLM 
of individual reciprocity (NR) as explained by percent of household needs met through the club 
and club age in years (see Appendix Table C.4). Club age was not found to be a significant 
predictor of reciprocity ratio, and 3.28 percent of the variance in reciprocity can be explained by 
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differences across groups. The LRT result shows that grouping by club ID is not a significant 
predictor of reciprocity. Results do not provide support for prediction 3C.  
 While club age may not be a significant predictor of reciprocity, club size may be. Club 
and age size are positively correlated, and it is likely that larger club size makes order-sharing 
easier by increasing the variety of preferences in the group. I estimate an HLM of NR explained 
by club size and controlling for % HH needs met (see Appendix Table C.5), and found that club 
size is a significant positive predictor of NR (effect size=0.58, p=0.01). Grouping by club ID did 
not change results or explain additional variation.  
Evidence for 4A: Rules Will Reduce Altruism & Support Cooperation  
Qualitative results support the prediction that more formally organized clubs tend to 
express less altruism and more cooperation than informal clubs. Quotes are chosen from 
interviews and online surveys to highlight trends identified across groups, and are generally 
representative of those groups. The informal clubs in this study are primarily operated by 
coordinators, who run the groups with little or no contributions from members. When asked 
about member contributions, one coordinator said, “because the club is small, I don’t mind doing 
all the work." Another coordinator said that work tasks were not fairly distributed among 
members, but might be “if the club got larger” since “there is not enough work to be spread 
among members.” Many coordinators of informal groups admitted that they would like more 
help from members, since they tend to do all of the work and make all decisions regarding club 
operation. Coordinators of clubs with formal rules and norms told a very different story. When 
asked about member contributions, they gave responses like “everybody is required to do 
something, and does their job” and “it’s not hard to get people to [contribute]. There are no 
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problems with free-riders.” These more formal clubs are highly cooperative, soliciting help from 
all members to run the groups rather than relying on the altruism of a few individuals.  
To measure the effect of rules adopted on individual measures of cooperation, I estimate 
two HLMs of dictator and public goods game donations regressed on number of rules adopted 
and control for age, income, gender, and percent of household needs met through the club (see 
Appendix Tables C.6 and C.7). Number of rules adopted was not found to be a significant 
predictor of donations in either game. Between-group variation explains 13.26 percent of 
variation in dictator game donations, and club ID grouping was reported as significant 
(LRT=4.59, p=0.032). Between-group variation explains 3.18 percent of variation in public 
goods game donations, and was not a significant predictor of donations. These results do not 
provide support for prediction 4A, and are in apparent disagreement with qualitative data.  
Evidence for 4B: Rules Will Promote Club Functionality 
Qualitative results from surveys and interviews support the prediction that rules promote 
club functionality. While some coordinators of informal groups are happy to altruistically 
provide services to others, or so invested in the club that they are willing to “do whatever it takes 
to make it happen,” others have become frustrated with the lack of support. One coordinator 
explained that running the club without any help from members is causing them to lose their 
patience and “weed out less reliable members.” Another coordinator said, “although I take care 
of all facets of the club…I wish my members were able to be more involved.” The coordinators 
aren’t the only ones who recognize this problem; many members of informal clubs wish to be 
more involved in their clubs. One respondent said, “I wish there was more opportunity for more 
participation in the workload, […] or that the coordinator would get some financial benefit from 
doing all the work.” Other members admitted feeling guilty, saying things like “I feel bad that 
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the responsibility of ordering, collecting money, and sorting food falls primarily on just one 
person.” Many respondents expressed concern about the future of their group. One member 
worries that “if a few key helpers/coordinators could not do it any longer, the buying club would 
not function well.” Coordinators and members of clubs with more rules said things like, “I’m 
very satisfied,” “I love my club,” and “our club rocks.”  
Table 2.8. Interview & Survey Quotes About Club Functionality. 
# of rules 
adopted 
What members & coordinators say 
1 rule 
“There is no decision making or almost any volunteer contribution besides my 
own. I am not sure why I am continuing to do this unpaid job.” 
“Members need to contribute more. The same people always help.” 
2 rules “[Running the club] is a big pain.” 
3 rules* “It was all me [doing the work], especially by the end.” 
4 rules 
“For the most part members carry their weight.” 
“I have yet to come across anything that is not well thought out and executed. 
[…] the club is much better organized and run than any other groups we belong 
to.” 
5 rules “Everybody steps up […] it seems like people feel a sense of responsibility.” 
6 rules 
“I love my club. I don’t need it for many things, but I would really miss having 
it around. [The coordinator] does an excellent job!” 
“I love my club” and “I’m very satisfied” 
*dead club 
To estimate the effect of number of rules adopted on club functionality, I estimate a HLM 
of club overall function explained by number of rules adopted, and controlling for % HH needs 
met through the club (see Appendix Table C.8). Number of rules adopted was found to be a 
positive significant predictor of overall function (effect size=2.81, p=0.08). Only 6.83 percent of 
the variation in club function can be explained by differences in between clubs, so grouping by 
club ID is not a significant predictor of club function.  
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Evidence for 4C: Rules Will Help Clubs Survive 
To test the effect of number of rules adopted on club age, I estimate a univariate OLS 
regression of the form 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜀, where 𝑌 is club age in years and 𝑥 is the number of rules 
adopted in a club (see Appendix Table C.9). Number of rules had a significant effect on club age 
(effect=3.33, p=0.00). However, this model is limited to only 12 degrees of freedom. To obtain a 
more robust result, I conducted a bootstrap analysis on this model with 1000 iterations. Bootstrap 
results indicate that number of rules is a significant predictor of club age, with an additional rule 
increasing club age by about 3.34 years (p=0.00). The 95% confidence interval for this effect 
size was 2.5–4.3. 
For this prediction, causation is difficult to prove. I cannot be certain whether rules cause 
clubs to survive longer (adaptation), or longer-living clubs have more experience and 
opportunity to adopt rules (learning). The data is consistent with both of these predictions, and I 
expect that in reality, a combination of both is at play in the evolution of buying clubs.  
Summary of Results 
 Overall, results indicate that buying club members are cooperative toward their groups, 
and do exercise reciprocity in order-sharing. Model results indicate that the only variables by 
which a significant proportion of the variance can be explained by group differences include 
overall club function (P3B: reciprocity will promote functionality), and dictator game donations 
(P4A: rules will reduce the need for altruism). For the other models, results did not vary 
significantly between groups. NR was not found to be a significant predictor of game donations 
or club function. Club age was not a significant predictor of individual NR, but club size was. 
The number of rules adopted was not a significant predictor of game donations, but was a 
significant predictor of overall club function. Overall, results suggest that group-level variables 
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don’t generally appear to be strong predictors of individual-level outcomes in all cases, except 
for in the case of club size being positively associated with NR, and number of rules adopted 
being positively associated with overall club function. The number of rules adopted was also 
found to be significantly positively associated with club age.  
Study Limitations 
 There are a handful of limitations important to note in this study. First, there may be a 
considerable amount of bias impacting survey results. This research does not obtain a random 
sample of buying clubs. The non-random sample makes it difficult to generalize results to larger 
populations (e.g. buying clubs in the U.S.). Also, while response rates for groups were fairly 
high, it is likely that self-selection bias may impact responses, where more cooperative members 
may have chosen to partake over those less cooperative. This bias has the potential to inflate 
measures of cooperation including experimental games. In addition, many questions were left 
unanswered or partially answered in the survey, leaving gaps in the data and making it difficult 
to obtain a complete picture of the individuals in the clubs. Finally, it is possible that the 
measures of reciprocity in the online survey could be influenced by self-serving bias, the 
tendency to see oneself in an overly favorable light (Myers, 2015). It would be useful to compare 
individuals’ reported measures of reciprocity to what is observed in their purchasing history, 
which would help lend some insight into this question of biased survey responses.  
 Second, this thesis does not formally analyze the qualitative data collected, but rather 
treats it as a supplement to the quantitative data examined. Qualitative interview and survey 
responses provide key insights and supporting material for quantitative results, but some data 
(e.g. number of rules adopted) can be difficult to quantify. Further, the number of rules might not 
always be as important as the type of rule and the extent to which it is enforced or not. For 
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instance, a rule that requires members to pick up their order on time might not have the same 
effect on coopertation as one that requires members to complete their work task.  
 Finally, the sample used in this research is relatively small, with only 14 buying clubs 
and 177 individuals represented in the dataset. Consequently, the analyses conducted here have 
limited statistical power. A larger, random sample would provide more robust results.   
Discussion & Conclusions 
Overall, results provided general support for predictions 1, 2, and 4, and findings were 
consistent across data collection instruments. Buying club members were found to behave 
cooperatively toward their groups, and exercise reciprocity in order-sharing. Reciprocity was not 
found to be a strong predictor of cooperation, altruism, overall function, or club survival, and is 
likely not an adaptation as I had originally predicted. However, free-riding (receiving more than 
giving in splits) appears to be more common in larger clubs, wheras smaller clubs tended to have 
more instances of altruism (receiving less than giving). These results suggest that club size may 
free up constraints on individual altruists, likely by expanding and diversifying preferences 
within the group. Reciprocity may not be an adaptation in the sense that more reciprocity helps 
clubs succeed or survive, but may be a key metric to determine whether clubs are faced with a 
dangerous reliance on altruism or free-ridership, both of which can cause long-term problems for 
groups.    
Qualitative and quantitative evidence provide general support for the prediction that rules 
will help clubs succeed. While rule adoption doesn’t appear to be correlated with individual 
game behavior, clubs with more rules reported significantly higher functionality. Rule adoption 
also had a small singificant effect on club age, suggesting that rules may help clubs survive. 
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Overall, rules appear to be an important aspect of buying club evolution, whether they represent 
more of an adaptive process or are an example of institutional learning. 
Institutional Adaptations & Organizational Change in Buying Clubs 
This thesis presents evidence relevant to specific predictions regarding cooperation in 
buying clubs and the mechanisms that sustain it. These results provide general support for my 
overarching adaptive hypothesis of buying clubs, and may be used to refine and enhance the 
evolutionary model, shaping future research. Evidence collected across all sources in this study 
suggests strongly that buying clubs are cooperatively-structured organizations which require 
members to cooperate with one another, both economically and organizationally. This reliance 
on cooperation is tightly connected to many of the challenges clubs face, including sharing bulk 
orders, reaching order minimums, fairly distributing labor, and others. The availability of more 
convenient food vendors makes buying club membership a costly undertaking, which makes 
clubs less resilient in the face of harsh economic conditions and exogenous shocks (e.g. loss of a 
meeting space, loss of a key member or coordinator, etc.). Thus, clubs which are able to 
overcome the challenges of order-sharing and organization likely possess certain adaptations that 
support cooperation. This research found support for rule adoption as an institutional adaptation, 
but not reciprocity. Smaller clubs in this study tended to rely more on the generous acts of 
individual altruists to fill bulk orders, whereas larger clubs offered enough flexibility for 
individuals to actually free-ride on the benefits of the group. Hence, it is possible that the 
relevant adaptation is club size, which eases the presssures of order-sharing. Size will likely 
become an important variable in future projects concerned with cooperation and the 
organizational evolution of buying clubs. A refined version of the original adaptive hypothesis 
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may focus on rule adoption and club size as two key adaptations that help clubs succeed and 
survive.  
Applications for Buying Clubs 
 There are a number of key takeaways from this research relevant to the organization and 
management of food buying clubs. One of the major patterns that emerged in survey and 
interview responses was the challenge of maintaining group membership. Clubs often struggle to 
recruit a sufficient number of motivated and reliable members to ensure that orders are filled, 
splits are possible, and work tasks are evenly distributed without overburdening coordinators. 
When asked about an optimal group size for their club, many coordinators provided a number 
between 20 and 25 people, yet the average size of the clubs in this study population is 15. Group 
size is also a determinant of reciprocity. Having a sufficient group size is key for sustaining 
cooperation and reducing reliance on altruistic individuals in buying clubs.  
 Another characteristic that supports cooperation and reduces the burden on individual 
altruists in buying clubs is the adoption of rules. Many coordinators who manage all aspects of 
their clubs expressed frustration, and members of these groups often admitted to feeling guilty 
about not contributing or wishing they could be more involved. The adoption of rules in a buying 
club can help disperse responsibility across members by holding them accountable for paying on 
time, placing regular orders, attending meetings, performing work tasks, and participating in 
whatever capacity is needed to keep the group running smoothly. These rules differ depending 
on the size, schedule, and organization of the club, and should be designed to suit a club’s 
particular needs. Some of the older clubs in the study have experienced periods of struggle, 
which ultimately led to a change in leadership, organization, or rules, allowing the clubs to adapt 
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and succeed. The ability to learn from mistakes and challenges and be fluid enough to make 
necessary changes appears to be an important determinant of club success and longevity.  
Future Research 
 One limitation of this study is that it does not differentiate club rules by type. Future 
projects might explore how the type of rule adopted by clubs influences outcomes both at the 
individual group level. Creating an index of rules and categorizing them by type and level of 
formality may provide further insight into how rules emerge, evolve, and impact club success. 
Finally, there is a large amount of data excluded from this analysis that could be integrated in 
creative ways. For instance, future work might compare survey and interview results with social 
network statistics derived from club purchasing history to capture the intricacies of order-
sharing. Variables measured in the online surveys and interviews also remain to be analyzed, 
including measures of how closely clubs integrate rules similar to Ostrom’s institutional design 
principles. Other variables measured that were not analyzed in this thesis but may be of interest 
include frequency of splits failing due to lack of support, changes in food preferences due to 
experience in the club, hours worked for the club, costs and benefits of participating in the club, 
and decision-making structure of the club.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Coordinator Interview Questions 
 
University of Maine 
Notice of Informed Consent  
 
You are invited to participate in a research project lead by professor Tim Waring and student 
researchers at the University of Maine. The project is a study of the challenges faced by food 
buying clubs, and the solutions that groups have discovered. You must be at least 18 years of age 
to participate. 
  
What Will You Be Asked to Do? You will be asked to answer a series of questions regarding 
the way your buying club operates.  
 
Voluntary: Participation is voluntary; you may stop the interview at any time.  
 
Confidentiality: Your responses will be treated confidentially, and will be encrypted for 
security. Your email address and personal identifying information will never be published, 
presented, or shared outside of the research team. Identifying information will be destroyed at the 
end of the project (~5 years). Summary data (key findings, trends, themes etc.) will be shared 
with Adi Fairbank (or Jeremy Bloom), and buying club participants, but no raw data will be 
shared.  
  
Risks: The only risks to participating in this experiment are the time and inconvenience of 
participation.  
  
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to you. The research will benefit society by improving our 
understanding of food buying clubs and cooperation.  
 
Compensation: There will be no compensation, monetary or otherwise, for your participation in 
this interview.  
 
Contact: If you have any questions about the research or its goals, please contact Afton Hupper 
at afton.hupper@maine.edu or (207) 691-1786, Taylor Lange at 
taylor.z.lange@maine.edu (607) 201-2441 or Dr. Waring at timothy.waring@maine.edu. Any 
questions about your rights as a participant may be directed to Gayle Jones, Assistant to the 
University of Maine’s Protection of Human Subjects, Institutional Review Board (IRB), at 
gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu or by phone: (207) 581-1498.            
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Do you understand the risks and benefits, and agree to participate in this interview?  
 
Introduction 
Thanks for chatting with me today. We are a small research group at the University of Maine. 
We are studying what makes food buying clubs successful Thank you for making this study 
possible! We’ll let you know what we find. Today, I was hoping to learn a little more about your 
group, and its history. 
 
History 
1. So, when did you become coordinator? [year] 
2. What year was your club established? [year] 
3. Please describe your group and how it works. [ex. club, farm, store, etc.] 
4. How does your group use foodclub.org?  
5. Can you give a basic timeline of the history of the club? Or, what are the biggest changes 
the club has seen? [list of events and rough dates] 
a. For each: 
i. What caused the change? [take notes] 
ii. What was the result of the change? [take notes] 
Look for signs of changes in cooperation, rules, numbers 
b. Are there any other major changes you can think of? [complete the list] 
 
Group Function 
Can you help me understand a little about how your group works? 
 
6. How does your group coordinate orders? [verbal description] 
 
Splits 
Splitting bulk purchases is often a central part of what makes food clubs work.  
  
1. Is splitting items important for your group? In other words, if you could not split 
purchases, would the group still function?    
2. What is the right amount of splitting (%) or this group? [is there a sweet spot?] 
3. In your experience, is there a group size that works best?  Please explain. [is this related 
to item splitting?] 
 
Cooperation & Contributions 
Often, many types of work are needed to keep the club running smoothly.  
 
4. What tasks or jobs are important to make the club run smoothly? [ex. bookkeeping, 
hosting meetings, breaking down orders, organizing, etc.] 
5. In your view, are these work tasks fairly distributed among members? [does the club have 
a problem with “free-riders?”] 
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Clearly defined boundaries 
6. Are the members of your buying club well-defined? [e.g. is it clear who is a member and 
who is not?] 
7. Are there any requirements for members to join and/or stay in your club? [ex. 
membership fees, ordering requirements, perform work tasks, etc.] 
 
Congruence between rules and conditions 
8. How formal are the rules of your group? [are they written down and enforced, or are they 
informal social norms?] 
9. Do members of your buying club generally follow the rules formulated by the group? 
[order-sharing, contributing labor, organizing, helping you, etc.] 
 
Collective-choice arrangements  
10. When the group makes a change, how is it decided? [ex. new supplier, coordinator, 
meting times, etc.] [look for hierarchical vs participatory] 
11. Do members participate in making decisions regarding the organization and management 
of the buying club?  
 
Monitoring 
In some groups, complying with any group rules and standards requires monitoring. 
12. Does your group have any need to monitor behavior? If so, how is that done? [official 
monitor, everyone monitors, not needed, other system, etc.] 
 
Graduated sanctions 
13. What happens if members violate these “rules”?  Are sanctions or punishments imposed 
on members if they violate the rules? [e.g. removal from the group, intervention, informal 
discussion, etc.] 
a. If so, do those sanctions or punishments vary depending on the seriousness or 
context of the rule breaking? [e.g. graduated?] 
 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
14. What happens when there is a conflict between members or leaders? Is there any 
procedure or routine for dealing with conflicts? [ex. informal discussion, intervention 
etc.] 
Rights to organize 
15. Does the group have the freedom to organize as they see fit, or does is face external 
constraints? [ex. laws/regulations, other institutional hurdles] 
Challenges and Successes 
16. What are some of the biggest challenges faced by your group, now and in the past?  
17. What have been the biggest successes or breakthroughs your club has experienced?  
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Thanks so much for your time! We will share our findings with you as soon as possible. 
 
Cooperation Tools - Trial 
I have one last question for you and your group. 
We think that cooperation science can help food clubs thrive. 
If you are interested, we could share some materials and ideas with your group on that. 
 
18. Do you think you group would be interested?  
a. If so, would it be okay for us to send your club a link to our online survey 
designed for food buying clubs?  
b. Since working with foodclub, we now have the opportunity to study your club’s 
purchasing history to try to glean more information about your cooperative 
purchasing behavior, would that be alright with you?  
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Appendix B: Food Club Survey 
 
University of Maine Notice of Informed Consent  
 
You are invited to participate in a research project lead by professor Tim Waring and student 
researchers at the University of Maine. The project is a study of the challenges faced by food 
buying clubs, and the solutions that groups have discovered. You must be at least 18 years of age 
to participate. 
  
What Will You Be Asked to Do?  
You will be asked to play two economic games with real money provided by the researcher, 
some of which you will get to keep. You will also be asked to complete a survey about your 
experience with your food buying club. In total this should take about 15 minutes. 
  
Risks: The only risks to participating in this experiment are the time and inconvenience of 
participation. 
  
Compensation: The economic games provide monetary compensation ranging from $0 to $35, 
depending on your choices in the game.   
 
Confidentiality: Your responses will be treated confidentially, and will be encrypted for 
security. You will be anonymous to other players in the economic games. You will be asked to 
select your club ID from a list, and provide your email address so that we can compensate you. 
Email addresses, club IDs and personal identifying information will never be published, 
presented, or shared outside of the research team. Identifying information will be destroyed at the 
end of the project (~5 years). Summary data (key findings, trends, themes etc.) will be shared 
with foodclub.org, and buying club participants, but no raw data will be shared.  
  
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to you. The research will benefit society by improving our 
understanding of food buying clubs and cooperation. 
  
Voluntary: Participation is voluntary. You may stop at any time. However, if you stop before 
the end of the survey we will not be able to calculate your payment, or pay you. 
  
Contact: If you have any questions about the research or its goals, please contact Afton Hupper 
at afton.hupper@maine.edu or (207) 691-1786, Taylor Lange at 
taylor.z.lange@maine.edu (607) 201-2441 or Dr. Waring at timothy.waring@maine.edu. Any 
questions about your rights as a participant may be directed to Gayle Jones, Assistant to the 
University of Maine’s Protection of Human Subjects, Institutional Review Board (IRB), at 
gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu or by phone: (207) 581-1498.            
	
70 
 
By continuing you signal that you understand the risks and benefits and agree to participate. 
 
Thank you for taking time to fill out this survey.  
 
Local Food Science is a collaborative research group at the University of Maine. We're working 
to find the best solutions to the biggest challenges faced by food buying clubs. Your responses 
are critical. We will share the results once your group has finished the survey. We hope they will 
help!  
  
 After a required University research statement, the survey proceeds as follows: 
     Two paid economic games (2 min)   
Buying club experiences (10 min)   
Demographic information (3 min)    
 All together, it should take about 15 minutes to complete. We look forward to your input! 
    - The Local Food Science team 
 
Economic Games     
• First you will play two separate economic games. 
 • Your identity and responses will be completely confidential. 
 • You will be anonymous to other players, and they will be anonymous to you. 
 
First Game 
You are playing with: another person in your buying club. 
      
• You have an endowment of $8. 
• You may choose to contribute any whole-dollar amount ($0 to $8) to the other player.   
• You will be paid the amount you chose to keep. 
• The other player will be paid the amount you chose to contribute to them. 
 
1. Use the slider to indicate how much, if any, you will contribute to another person in your 
buying club. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Second Game  
You are playing with the all other members of your buying club.    
  
• You have an endowment of $8.    
• You may choose to contribute any whole-dollar amount ($0 to $8) to a group fund. 
• Every other player may choose to contribute to the group fund. 
• The group fund will grow by 40%, then be divided equally between every member of the 
Dollars contributed () 
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group, regardless of their individual contributions.  
• You will be paid the amount you kept, plus your equal share of the final group fund. 
• Every other player faces the same scenario as you. 
 
2. Use the slider to indicate how much, if any, you contribute to your buying club's group 
fund. Remember, the group fund will be increased 40% and divided evenly between all 
members. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Dollars contributed () 
 
 
Thank you. Your choices have been recorded. We will calculate your payment once all responses 
are recorded. 
  
To make payment possible, you will be asked to provide your email address at the end of the 
survey. If you fail to complete the survey and provide a correct email address, we will be unable 
to pay you. Next, we ask a series of questions on your experience with your buying club. 
 
3. When did you join your food buying club? 
▼ 2018 (1) ... Before 1990 (70) 
 
4. Prior to joining one, how did you first learn about food buying clubs? 
 
5. What are your primary motivations for joining your buying club? 
Select all that apply. 
q To save money on food  
q To gain access to certain foods   
q To meet health and dietary preferences   
q To support local producers   
q To support good environmental practices   
q To support good social practices   
q To avoid industrialized food    
q To socialize with club members   
q Due to familiarity with buying clubs   
q Due to personal connection or invitation   
q Other  ________________________________________________ 
 
	
72 
6. What percent of your total household needs are met through your buying club? 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
% of needs met () 
 
 
7. People in buying clubs often split big, bulk purchases. 
 
Of your purchases: 
 None Some Half Most All 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
How many of your purchases require the 
help of other club members to split? ()  
How often do you receive the help you need 
in splitting items? ()  
 
8.  How often do you initiate a split purchase that fails (due to lack of support)? 
 Never Sometimes About 
half the 
time 
Most of 
the time 
Always 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
 
Frequency of "failed" splits () 
 
 
9. Do you ever buy items that don't fit your own preferences in order to help someone fill a 
shared purchase?  
m Yes   
m No   
 
10. On average, what percent of your purchases don't match your own preferences, but help 
others split bulk items? 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Percent of items () 
 
 
 
11. When you help others complete splits, how often do they reciprocate on average? 
 Never Sometimes Half of 
the time 
Most of 
the time 
Always 
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 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Frequency of reciprocity () 
 
 
12. What percent of members of your club typically reciprocate after they receive help 
completing a split? 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
13. Please select the types of foods that you purchase through the buying club. (Select all that 
apply) 
m Organic    
m Fair trade   
m Non-GMO    
m Sustainably sourced   
m Rare, ethnic or specialty foods   
m Local food   
m Other  ________________________________________________ 
 
14. Have your food preferences or habits changed due to your experience in the buying club? 
If yes, please explain how. 
m Yes  ________________________________________________ 
m No   
 
Participation   
This section focuses on your participation in the buying club. 
 
15. How many hours per week, on average, do you do work tasks for the buying club? 
(Work tasks might include hosting deliveries, financial bookkeeping, scheduling or arranging 
deliveries, etc.) 
 
▼ 0 (1) ... More than 20 (11) 
16. Please consider how your group functions. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
 Agree 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
 
% of members () 
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My group communicates well. () 
 
Members contribute their fair share of the 
work. ()  
Members benefit from participating. () 
 
Members help each other complete bulk 
purchases when needed. ()  
My group functions well overall. () 
 
 
17. Please reflect on the various costs and benefits of participating in the buying 
club.  Participating... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
 Agree 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
 
... benefits me financially. () 
 
... costs me financially. () 
 
... benefits me socially. () 
 
... costs me    socially. () 
 
OVERALL: Participation benefits outweigh 
costs. ()  
 
18. If your club operates on a set of "rules," do you view those rules as fair? Please explain your 
answer. 
m Yes   ________________________________________________ 
m No   ________________________________________________ 
m We do not have any rules.  
 
19. Please rank the accuracy of the following statements in terms of your buying club. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
 Agree 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
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I have a strong sense of belonging to the 
buying club. ()  
When I talk about the buying club, I usually 
say "we" rather than "they." ()  
The needs and wants of other members of the 
buying club influence my needs and wants. ()  
The buying club requires effort from all 
members to function. ()  
 
 
19. As a member of this buying club, are you included in group decisions? (i.e. changes in 
suppliers, goals, rules, etc.) 
 Not at all Somewhat Partially Mostly Fully 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
 
I feel included in decisions () 
 
 
20. In general, how happy or satisfied are you with your group? 
 Very 
Unsatisfied 
Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
 
Level of satisfaction () 
 
 
20. Do you have unmet needs you wish the club could provide? If so, what changes would you 
like to see? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
Demographic Information   
 
 The basic information provided in this section will be kept strictly confidential. 
21. Please select your age. 
▼ 18 (1) ... 100 (83) 
22. What is your gender? 
▼ Male (1) ... Prefer not to say (3) 
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23. Please describe your ethnicity by selecting all that apply.  
q White   
q Black or African American   
q Latino / Latina   
q American Indian or Alaska Native   
q Asian   
q Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
q Prefer not to say   
q Other    
 
24. Please select your highest completed education level. 
▼ Some high school ... PhD, JD, MD, etc.  
25. What is your approximate annual household income? 
 More than 150K 
 
 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 
 
Approximate annual household income (in 
thousands) ()  
 
26. Please select your employment status. 
▼ Employed full time (1) ... Disabled (7) 
 
27. How many dependents are in your household? 
________________________________________________________________ 
foodclub.org  
 Please consider how your group uses foodclub.org to organize shared orders. Your responses 
here will help improve foodclub.org.   
 
28. How satisfied are you with foodclub.org's service? 
 
 Very 
Unsatisfied 
Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Very 
Satisfied 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 
 
Satisfaction () 
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29. What do you appreciate about foodclub.org? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. How could foodclub.org improve its service? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Payment Details   
 
 One last step... electronic payment! 
 We use a free service called Square Cash to send your games payments electronically. 
  
 Square Cash Details: 
 - Square Cash is secure, fast, and will deposit the payment into your bank account.   
- You will need a current debit card to accept the payment.   
- You will receive an email from cash@square.com, with a link to accept the payment. 
 - You will have 14 days to accept the payment. 
 - The deposit will appear on your bank statement as “SQC*WARING” or “SQ*WARING”.   
    
31. Please enter your email address below so we can send you your payment: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
You're all done! Thank you.   
  
Your answers will help us better understand the best solutions buying clubs have found to their 
hardest challenges. Once everyone has been able to complete the survey and games, and we have 
analyzed them all, we will share the survey results with you and your club. We hope that the 
findings will be interesting and useful! 
  
 Don't Forget:   
 **Look for an email from cash@square.com with instructions to accept your games 
payment!**    
                                                                          - The Local Food Science Team 
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Appendix C: Regression Tables 
 
 
Table C.1. OLS Model of Net 
Received Regressed on Dictator 
Game Donation 
 Dependent variable:  
 DG  
Age  -0.292*  
 (0.173)  
HH income 0.394**  
 (0.173)  
Gender (male)  -0.612  
 (0.631)  
% HH needs met  -0.290  
 (0.180)  
NR  -0.003  
 (0.008)  
Constant  4.522***  
 (0.198)  
Observations  96  
Log Likelihood  -190.868  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  397.737  
Bayesian Inf. 
Crit.  418.252  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	 	
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Table C.2. OLS Model of Net Received 
Regressed on Public Goods Game 
Donation 
 Dependent variable:  
 PGG  
Club age -0.390  
 (0.245)  
HH income  0.417*  
 (0.243)  
Gender(Male) 0.263  
 (0.898)  
% HH needs met  0.203  
 (0.248)  
Net received 0.002  
 (0.011)  
Constant  5.403***  
 (0.279)  
Observations  97  
Log Likelihood  -224.970  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  465.939  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  486.537  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
	
80 
Table C.3. OLS Model of Overall  
Function Regressed on Net Received 
 Dependent variable:  
 Overall function  
% HH needs met  0.905  
 (2.015)  
NR  0.037  
 (0.079)  
Constant  80.580***  
 (3.200)  
Observations  99  
Log Likelihood  -430.975  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  871.949  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  884.925  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table C.4. OLS Model of Net Received 
Regressed on Club Age  
 Dependent variable:  
 NR  
% HH needs met  -3.104  
 (2.426)  
Club age  1.031  
 (2.356)  
Constant  -11.292***  
 (2.739)  
Observations  108  
Log Likelihood  -492.041  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  994.081  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  1,007.492  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table C.5. OLS Model of Net  
Received Regressed on Club Size 
 Dependent variable:  
 NR  
% HH needs met  -0.230**  
 (0.101)  
  
Number of  
members  0.257
***  
 (0.098)  
  
Constant  -0.015  
 (0.093)  
Observations  110  
Log Likelihood  -156.123  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  322.246  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  335.748  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table C.6. OLS Model of Dictator Game  
Donation Regressed on Club Age  
 Dependent variable:  
 DG donation 
Club age in years  -0.269*  
 (0.146)  
HH income  0.413***  
 (0.155)  
Gender (male)  0.387  
 (0.523)  
Gender (other) -2.750  
 (1.734)  
  
% HH needs met  0.105  
 (0.162)  
Rules  -0.202  
 (0.148)  
Constant  5.366***  
 (0.567)  
Observations  139  
Log Likelihood  -273.113  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  564.227  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  590.637  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table C.7. OLS Model of Public  
Goods Game Donation Regressed  
on Club Age   
 Dependent variable:  
 PGG  
Age in years  -0.378*  
 (0.206)  
HH income  0.212  
 (0.213)  
Gender (male)  0.712  
 (0.739)  
Gender (other)  -4.441*  
 (2.457)  
% HH needs met  0.297  
 (0.219)  
Rules  0.062  
 (0.157)  
Constant  5.366***  
 (0.598)  
Observations  140  
Log Likelihood  -320.196  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  658.391  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  684.866  
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table C.8. OLS Model of Overall  
Function Regressed on Rules  
 Dependent variable:  
 Overall function  
% HH needs met  0.955  
 (1.737)  
Rules  2.811**  
 (1.430)  
Constant  70.768***  
 (5.536)  
Observations  140  
Log Likelihood  -610.703  
Akaike Inf. Crit.  1,231.405  
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  1,246.114  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table C.9. OLS Model of Club Age  
Regressed on Rules 
 Dependent variable:  
 Club age (years) 
Number of rules  3.333***  
 (0.499)  
Constant  4.253**  
 (1.902)  
Observations  164  
R2  0.216  
Adjusted R2  0.211  
Residual Std. Error  10.131 (df = 162)  
F Statistic  44.692*** (df = 1; 162)  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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